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Article 61 
Conservation of the living resources 
James Harrison, University of Edinburgh 
Elisa Morgera, University of Strathclyde 
1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive 
economic zone. 
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure 
through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. As 
appropriate, the coastal State and competent international organizations, whether 
subregional, regional or global, shall cooperate to this end. 
3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested 
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing 
communities and the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account 
fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international 
minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global. 
4. In taking such measures the coastal State shall take into consideration the effects on species 
associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring 
populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction 
may become seriously threatened. 
5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant 
to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis 
through competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, 
where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, including States whose 
nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone. 
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I. Purpose and Function 
1 7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQH((=PHDQVWKDWPRVWRIWKHZRUOG¶V
fish stocks are now subject to the jurisdiction of coastal States. It is estimated that about 95% of the 
capture fisheries take place in waters within 200 nautical miles of the coast.1 Whilst Art. 56 of the 
Convention confers sovereign rights to explore and exploit the living resources in the EEZ, 2 such 
rights also come with a responsibility to conserve and manage these resources. Indeed, one of the 
principal rationales for extending coastal State jurisdiction was to permit greater control of fisheries 
by coastal States. In the words of one proponenWRIWKH((=DW81&/26,,,µRQO\WKHFRDVWDO6WDWH
was in a position to apply the necessary conservation measures and plan the development of ocean 
VSHFLHV¶3 This view was based on the assumption that the ability to fish would be effectively 
controlled and regulated by the coastal State so as to reduce over-capitalization of fishing fleets and 
therewith the potential for overfishing. Both of these objectives have been quite difficult to achieve 
in practice, however.4 
2 The purpose of Art. 61 is to set out the basic obligations of a coastal State in relation to the 
conservation and management of living resources in the EEZ. It applies only to living resources and 
there is no equivalent provision for non-living resources, such as oil and gas.5 7KHWHUPµOLYLng 
UHVRXUFH¶± which was conceived and has hitherto been applied in relation to fisheries ± may be 
interpreted as including the later concept of biodiversity in accordance with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD),6 to which all States Parties to the 1982 Convention are also party,7 thus 
allowing a broader interpretation of the provision in relation to conservation, sustainable use and 
impacts on ecosystems within the EEZ.8 It remains subject to debate, however, whether such an 
                                                          
1 See e.g. UNCED, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, UN Doc. 
A.CONF/151/26/REV.1 (Vol. I) (1992), 9 (Agenda 21), Ch. 17.70. 
2 For further information, see Proelss on Art. 56 MN XX CROSS REF. 
3 Statement of Zuleta Torres (Colombia), Second Committee UNCLOS III, 29th Meeting, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29 
(1974), OR II, 224, 225. 
4 Donna Christie, The Conservation and Management of Stocks Located Solely within the Exclusive Economic Zone, in: 
Ellen Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (1999), 395, 396. 
5 David M. Ong, Towards an International Law for the Conservation of Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources within the 
Continental Shelf?, in: David Freestone/Richard Barnes/David M. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects 
(2006), 93, 96. 
6 $UW&%'GHILQHVELRGLYHUVLW\DVµWKHYDULDELOLW\DPRQJOLYLQJRUJDQLVPVIURPDOOVRXUFHVLQFOXGLQJLQWHUDOLD
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes 
GLYHUVLW\ZLWKLQVSHFLHVEHWZHHQVSHFLHVDQGRIHFRV\VWHPV¶ 
7 Yoshifumi Tanaka, A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance (2008), 134. For further information, cf. Status of 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available via: http://treaties.un.org. 
8 Patricia Birnie/Alan Boyle/Catherine Redgwell,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQGWKH(QYLURQPHQWUGHGQµ>7@KH
&%'PD\KDYHPRGLILHGWKHILVKHULHVSURYLVLRQVRI81&/26¶WRWKHH[WHQWQHFHVVDU\WRHQVXUHWKDWILVKLQJDFWLYLWLHVGR
not cause or threaten serious damage to biodiversity in light of CBD Art. 22, while also acknowledging that certain 
FRQFHSWVLQWKH&RQYHQWLRQFDQEHµUHDGLO\LQWHUSUHWHGWRLQFOXGHPHDVXUHVDLPHGDWWKHSURWHFWLRQRIPDULQH
ELRGLYHUVLW\¶ 
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evolutionary interpretation would also lead to the inclusion of marine genetic resources under Art. 
61 and the applicability of the provisions on access to the surplus under Art. 62 to such resources.9 
3 It should be noted that several key elements of Art. 61 can be found verbatim in Art. 119 
UNCLOS, under the heading Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, namely: the 
determination of the total allowable catch (TAC) on the basis of scientific evidence available; the 
designation of measures to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels that can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors including the special requirements of developing States; the need to take into account fishing 
patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards; and the obligation to contribute to and exchange available scientific information on a 
regular basis through international organizations.10 
4 Art. 61 is not a self-standing provision; it must be read in light of the other provisions in 
Part V of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of living resources, notably 
Arts. 62-73. In addition, it should be read in light of the general obligations concerning the 
protection of the marine environment, rare or fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, 
threatened or endangered species (ĺ$UW$UW$UW.11 International legal 
developments related to the precautionary and ecosystem approach, furthermore, warrant an 
evolutionary interpretation of Art. 61.12 
II. Historical Background 
5 A duty to conserve fish in coastal waters was arguably already in existence at the turn of the 
20th century. In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, the arbiWUDOWULEXQDOKHOGWKDWµ*UHDW
Britain, as the local sovereign, has the duty of preserving and protecting the fisheries. In so far as it 
is necessary for that purpose, Great Britain is not only entitled, but obliged to provide for the 
protection and preserYDWLRQRIWKHILVKHULHV¶13 
6 The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas (High Seas Fishing Convention) already contained certain provisions to which the origin of 
Art. 61 can be traced back. Although the High Seas Fishing Convention prohibited coastal States 
from taking enforcement action against foreign nationals fishing in the high seas adjacent to their 
territorial waters,14 LWGLGUHFRJQL]HWKDWFRDVWDO6WDWHVKDYHµDVSHFLDOLQWHUHVW¶LQPDLQWDLQLQJWKH
productivity of high seas fisheries adjacent to their territorial sea.15 To balance these two 
DSSURDFKHVWKH+LJK6HDV)LVKLQJ&RQYHQWLRQHVWDEOLVKHGDµFRQYROXWHGSURFHGXUH¶16 allowing 
unilateral conservation measures in these areas where agreement with third States could not be 
                                                          
9 Charlotte Salpin, The Law of the Sea: A Before and an After Nagoya?, in: Elisa Morgera/Matthias Buck/Elsa Tsioumani 
(eds.), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing: Implications for International Law and Implementation 
Challenges (2012), 149 et seq. 
10 For further information, see Rayfuse on Art. 119. 
11 Tanaka (note 7), 134. 
12 On the precautionary and the ecosystem approach, see further Czybulka on Art. 192 and Art. 194. 
13 PCA, The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v. United States of America), Award of 7 September 1910, 
RIAA XI, 167 
14 Art. 6 (4) High Seas Fishing Convention. 
15 Art. 6 (1) High Seas Fishing Convention. 
16 Donald R. Rothwell/Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2010), 296. 
7 
 
 Harrison/Morgera  
reached. Accordingly, such unilateral conservation measures would be valid for third States if: there 
was a need for urgent application of these measures in the light of the existing knowledge of the 
fishery; the measures adopted were based on appropriate scientific findings; and they did not 
discriminate in form or in fact against foreign fishermen.17 The unilateral measures would then be 
subject to endorsement or overruling by a special fisheries commission with binding decision-
making powers.18 
7 The duty of conservation was also recognized in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. 
Iceland) in 1974. Judge NAGENDRA SINGH, in his declaration in that case, noted that:  
µ7KHODZSHUWDLQLQJWRILVKHULHVPXVWDFFHSWWKHSULPDF\IRUWKHQHHGRIFRQVHUYDWLRQEDVHGRQ
scientific data. This aspect has been properly emphasized to the extent needed to establish that the 
exercise of preferential rights of the coastal State, as well as the historic rights of other States 
dependent on the same fishing grounds, have all to be subject to the over-riding consideration of 
proper conservation of the fishery resources for the benefit of all concerned. This conclusion would 
appear warranted if this vital source of man's nutrition is to be preserved and developed for the 
FRPPXQLW\¶19 
8 It was on this basis that the ICJ ordered the parties to the dispute to negotiate an equitable 
solution to their differences, taking into account inter alia WKHµFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH
ILVKHU\UHVRXUFHV¶LQTXHVWLRQ20 The judgment in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. Iceland) 
was rendered whilst negotiations at UNCLOS III were already underway, and the Court noted that 
µ>W@KHYHU\fact of convening the third Conference on the Law of the Sea evidences a manifest 
desire on the part of all States to proceed to the codification of that law on a universal basis, 
including the question of fisheries and conservation of the living resources RIWKHVHD¶21 Indeed, the 
need for conservation had grown even greater over time as there was increasing evidence that many 
fish stocks were threatened by overfishing.22 
9 From the outset, the discussions at UNCLOS III concerning coastal State jurisdiction over 
fisheries assumed that such States must take measures to conserve and manage the fish stocks under 
their control. The crucial question concerned how much discretion the coastal State should have in 
deciding on appropriate conservation and management measures. On the one hand, some States 
proposed granting complete authority to the coastal State to decide such matters.23 On the other 
hand, some States were of the opinion that international fishery organizations and other fishing 
States should also have a role in managing fish stocks in the EEZ.24 
                                                          
17 Art. 7 High Seas Fishing Convention. 
18 Art. 6 (5) and Arts. 9-11 High Seas Fishing Convention, as summarized by Rothwell/Stephens (note 16), 296. 
19 ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment of 
25 July 1974, Declaration by Nagrenda Singh, ICJ Reports (1974), 3, 40. 
20 Ibid., 34 (para. 79). 
21 Ibid., 23 (para. 53). 
22 In LWQRWHGWKDWµPRVWPDMRUIDPLOLDUILVKVWRFNVWKURXJKRXWWKHZDWHUVRYHUFRQWLQHQWDOVKHOYHVZKLFKSURYLGH
SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG¶VILVKFDWFKDUHQRZWKUHDWHQHG¶6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO5HSRUWRIWKH:RUOG&RPPLVVLRQRQ(QYLURQPHQW
and Development, UN Doc. A/42/427 (1987), Annex (Our Common Future). 
23 See e.g. Second Committee UNCLOS III, Gambia et al.: Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82 (1974), OR III, 240. 
24 See e.g. Second Committee UNCLOS III, Bulgaria et al.: Draft Articles on the Economic Zone, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38 (1974), OR III, 214, 215 (Article 12). 
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10 A compromise was achieved between these two positions during the negotiations. The 
provision included in the negotiating text gave broad discretion to the coastal State to regulate fish 
stocks in their EEZ, whilst requiring it to take into account the recommendations of global, regional 
and subregional organizations. Despite several unsuccessful attempts to reduce the discretion of 
coastal States25, the final text of the Convention incorporates this basic compromise position (ĺ
Art. 61 (2); Art. 61 (3)). 
III. Elements 
µFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHV¶ 
11 Unlike the sequence of paragraphs in Art. 61, the following sub-sections will start with a 
discussion of the overall conservation and sustainable management objectives enshrined in Art. 61 
(2), and then continue focusing on the central link of conservation and sustainable management 
with the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) reflected in Art. 61 (3). Both of these factors 
are related to the determination of the TAC which is dealt with in Art. 61 (1) and is a prominent 
example of a conservation and management measure that must be taken by coastal States. The 
analysis will then turn to other possible conservation measures. Criteria for the determination of 
conservation and management measures are discussed, followed by an analysis of the role of 
science, precaution, exchange of information and cooperation with international organizations. 
12 $UWUHTXLUHVFRDVWDO6WDWHVWRWDNHµSURSHUFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHV¶
in relation to the living resources of the EEZ. The basic objective of such measures is to ensure that 
VXFKOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVDUHµQRWHQGDQJHUHGE\RYHU-H[SORLWDWLRQ¶7KHSURYLVLRQKDVEHHQFULWLFL]HG
for not specifying the unit to be maintained (stock, species, biomass) or the precise level at which it 
is to be maintained.26 7KHWHUPµHQGDQJHUHG¶LVQHLWKHUGHILQHGE\WKH&RQYHQWLRQDQGDVQRWHGE\
BURKE, the meaning of this term is not obvious. BURKE DUJXHVWKDWµWKHFRQFHSWRI³HQGDQJHUHG´
might be interpreted as implying a threat to survival, i.e., in danger of extinction, but it seems 
GRXEWIXOLIWKLVLVYHU\PHDQLQJIXORUKHOSIXO¶27 He therefore proposes that the term should be 
understood to refer WRµUHGXFWLRQVLQDEXQGDQFHWKDWDPRXQWWRFRPPHUFLDOH[WLQFWLRQRUPRUH
strictly, to reductions of such magnitude that a species is likely to become endangered unless 
SURWHFWLYHDFWLRQLVWDNHQ¶28 This appears to be the best understanding of the term in light of the 
REOLJDWLRQIRXQGLQ$UWVWRµDOVR¶DLPWRPDLQWDLQRUUHVWRUHSRSXODWLRQVRIILVKDWOHYHOVWKDW
will produce the MSY.  
µPD[LPXPVXVWDLQDEOH\LHOG¶ 
13 The concept of MSY is at the centre of the regime for the conservation and management of 
living resources in the Convention (see also ĺ$UW. It refers to the maximum catch that can be 
taken without negatively affecting the ability of a stock to maintain its population size. The term 
µSRSXODWLRQ¶LVQRWGHILQHGLQWKH&RQYHQWLRQEXWFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVµDJURXSRIILVKRIRQH
                                                          
25 Myron H. Nordquist/Satya N. Nandan/Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: 
A Commentary, vol. II (1993), 606-608. 
26 E.g. Marion Markowski, The International Law of EEZ Fisheries (2010), 26. 
27 William T. Burke, U.S. Fishery Management and the New Law of the Sea, AJIL 76 (1982), 24, 32. 
28 Ibid., 32. 
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species sharing common ecological and genetic features and more likely to breed with one another 
WKDQZLWKLQGLYLGXDOVIURPDQRWKHUVXFKJURXS¶29 
14 MSY is a biological concept that in principle can be calculated in an objective manner by 
the coastal State, provided that it has the relevant scientific information. However, the concept of 
MSY has been widely criticized by fisheries scientists and other commentators,30 significantly 
EHFDXVHRIWKHµIDFWXDOREVtacles inherent in determining cause and effect in respect of the use of 
OLYLQJUHVRXUFHV¶31 Whatever the merits of this debate, it is clear that coastal States have discretion 
to deviate from the objective of MSY when setting their conservation and management targets 
because Art. 61 (3) refers to MSY 
µDVTXDOLILHGE\UHOHYDQWHQYLURQPHQWDODQGHFRQRPLFIDFWRUVLQFOXGLQJWKHHFRQRPLFQHHGVRIFRDVWDOILVKLQJ
communities and the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the 
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether 
VXEUHJLRQDOUHJLRQDORUJOREDO¶32 
What environmental or economic factors should be taken into account will be up to the coastal State 
to decide and they would appear to have broad discretion in this regard. Indeed, despite the fact that 
the Convention makes no explicit reference to social factors, BURKE DUJXHVWKDWµWKHRWKHUWUHDW\
provisions in toto convey ample authority on the coastal [S]tate WRWDNHVXFKIDFWRUVLQWRDFFRXQW¶33 
Nonetheless, in the light of the object and purpose of this provision, as well as contemporary 
international environmental law, it is possible to conclude that MSY should be seen as acting as the 
upper limit beyond which harvesting levels are no longer sustainable: accordingly, coastal States 
are not allowed to set the qualified MSY above the biological MSY level.34 This is further 
FRQILUPHGE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWDUJHWHVWDEOLVKHGWRHQFRXUDJHDQGPRQLWRU6WDWHV¶HIIRUWVto achieve 
sustainable fisheries and restore depleted stocks to levels that can sustain the MSY.35 
15 A coastal State may also have to take into account the interests of other States in 
determining conservation and management measures, if Art. 61 is read in light of Art. 56(2), which 
UHTXLUHVDFRDVWDO6WDWHWRµKDYHGXHUHJDUGWRWKHULJKWVDQGGXWLHVRIRWKHU6WDWHV¶ZKHQµH[HUFLVLQJ
LWVULJKWVDQGSHUIRUPLQJLWVGXWLHVXQGHUWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHChagos Arbitration, 
the United Kingdom was held to have violated Art. 56(2) by declaring a no-take marine protected 
area in the waters around the Chagos archipelago, because it had failed to consult with Mauritius in 
breach of an agreement between the two countries dating back to Mauritian independence.36 The 
                                                          
29 Markowski (note 26), 26. 
30 See e.g. the discussion in Douglas M. Johnston, International Law of Fisheries (1965), 49-55; David J. Attard, The 
Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (1987), 153; Francisco O. Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime 
and Legal Nature under International Law (1989), 51. 
31 Richard Barnes, The Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Effective Framework for Domestic Fisheries Conservation? 
in: David Freestone Richard Barnes/David M. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (2006), 235 and 242. 
32 Emphasis added. 
33 Burke (note 27), 36. 
34 Markowski (note 26), 27-28; see the more pessimistic comments by Barnes (note 31), 243-244. 
35 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.199/20 (2002), 6 (Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development), 23 (para. 31(a)); 
and follow-up by the General Assembly: e.g., GA Res. 65/38 of 7 December 2010, para. 2.  
36 PCA (Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII UNCLOS), The Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration 
(Mauritius/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award of 18 March 2015, available at: http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1429. 
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$UELWUDO7ULEXQDOHODERUDWHGWKDWKDYLQJµGXHUHJDUG¶HQWDLOVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHµQDWXUHof rights 
held by [other countries], their importance, the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature and 
LPSRUWDQFHRIDFWLYLWLHVFRQWHPSODWHG>@DQGWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIDOWHUQDWLYHDSSURDFKHV¶OHDGLQJWR
DµFRQVFLRXVEDODQFLQJRIULJKWVDQGLQWHrests, suggestions of compromise and willingness to offer 
reassurances [...], and an understanding of [other countries'] concerns in connection with the 
SURSRVHGDFWLYLW\¶37 
µDOORZDEOHFDWFK¶ 
16 There are several types of conservation and management measures at the disposal of the 
coastal State to meet the objectives of Art. 61.38 One measure which would seem to be obligatory is 
WKHFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHµDOORZDEOHFDWFK¶$UWVD\VLQPDQGDWRU\WHUPVWKDWµWKHFRDVWDO6WDWH
shall determine the allowaEOHFDWFKRIWKHOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVLQLWVH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQH¶,WKDV
been suggested that this concept applies to both the overall catch in the EEZ and the allowable catch 
of individual stocks.39 The provision does not differentiate between the commercially exploited and 
other fish stocks, thus in principle applying irrespective of the significance of fish stocks for the 
ILVKLQJLQGXVWU\,QGHHGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7ULEXQDOIRUWKH/DZRIWKH6HDKDVVWUHVVHGWKDWµLQ
accordance with the Convention, the adoption by the coastal State of conservation and management 
PHDVXUHVIRUDOOOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVZLWKLQLWVH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQHLVPDQGDWRU\¶40 In practice, 
however, it is the allowable catch of commercially significant stocks that has generated most State 
practice as it is more important in light of the overarching duty to ensure that populations of 
harvestable species are maintained at levels that can produce the MSY. A recent review of State 
practice suggests that priority TACs are determined for fish stocks explored at or close to the 
maximum sustainable limit, but there is no consistent implementation of the obligation to establish 
TACs for all commercially significant stocks.41 One significant exception is the practice of the 
United States, which through a 2006 amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act requires annual catch limits to be set for all managed fisheries, whether or not 
they are currently overfished.42 
4. Other Conservation Measures 
17 The allowable catch is not the only conservation tool at the disposal of the coastal State. 
7KHSURYLVLRQUHIHUVWRµSURSHUFRQVHUYDWLRQPHDVXUHV¶6RPHFRQWHQWFDQEHJLYHQWRWKLVSKUDVHE\
referring to Art. 62 which lists some of the types of measures that may be included in coastal State 
legislation, including licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment; regulating seasons and 
areas of fishing; regulating the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used; 
regulating the types, sizes and amount of gear that might be used; and fixing the age and size of fish 
                                                          
37 Ibid., paras. 519 and 535. 
38 CfDOVRWKHZRUGLQJRI$UWµ,QGHWHUPLQLQJWKHDOORZDEOHFDWFKDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJRWKHUFRQVHUYDWLRQPHDVXUHV¶
For further information, see Rayfuse on Art. 119. 
39 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 25), 609. 
40 ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory 
Opinion of 2 April 2015, para. 96, available at: https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-21/. 
41 Markowski (note 26), 109-112.  
42 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 16 USC 1801. See Juliet 
Eilperin, US Tightens Fishing Policy, Setting 2012 Catch Limits for All Managed Species, Washington Post, 8 January 
2012. Note however, that the United States is currently not party to the Convention and therefore this practice is not 
carried out in order to fulfill specific obligations under Arts. 61 or 119. 
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that may be caught. Once again, the coastal State would seem to have a broad degree of discretion 
in deciding what conservation and management measures to utilize. Relevant international 
standards, howeYHULQFUHDVLQJO\LQIOXHQFHFRDVWDO6WDWHV¶FKRLFHRIDSSURSULDWHFRQVHUYDWLRQ
measures. 
5. Generally Recommended International Minimum Standards 
18 In determining its conservation and management measures, a coastal State must, pursuant to 
Art. 61 (3), takHLQWRDFFRXQWµDQ\JHQHUDOO\UHFRPPHQGHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGV
ZKHWKHUVXEUHJLRQDOUHJLRQDORUJOREDO¶7KLVUHIHUHQFHLVEURDGHQRXJKWRFRYHUDZLGHYDULHW\RI
fisheries standards adopted at the international level. In particular, it will cover several instruments 
adopted through the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Fisheries Committee.43 Prominent 
examples of generally recommended international standards adopted by the FAO include the Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,44 and the associated International Plans of Action which deal 
with Sharks, Seabirds, Fishing Capacity45, and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.46 
19 Relevant international standards also include generally recommended international 
minimum standards adopted by other regional or subregional bodies, including many regional 
fisheries management organizations. Moreover, it is not limited to instruments adopted by fisheries 
organizations and it may also apply to the recommendations adopted by environmental 
organizations.47 For example, decisions of the CBD Conference of the Parties relating to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity are relevant for coastal States when 
drawing up their conservation and management measures.48 CBD guidance has thus elaborated on 
the concept of integrated marine and coastal management, including the ongoing assessment and 
monitoring of marine and coastal living resources, their interactions and impacts on ecosystems;49 
maintenance of the productivity and biodiversity of important and vulnerable marine areas; 
elimination of destructive fishing practices;50 and more recently also the assessment of the impacts 
of climate change on the sustainability of fish stocks and the habitats that support them and the 
                                                          
43 See James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (2011), 225. 
44 FAO, Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries (1995). See generally Gerald Moore, The Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, in: Hey (note 4), 85. 
45 FAO, International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, International Plan of Action for 
Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity (1999). These plans were adopted at the 23rd session of the FAO Fisheries Committee in February 1999 and 
endorsed by the FAO Council in June 1999. 
46 FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2001). 
This plan was adopted at the 24th session of the FAO Fisheries Committee in March 2001 and endorsed by the FAO 
Council in June 2001. 
47 Art. 31 (3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
48 See the so-called Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, COP CBD, Report of the Second Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19 (1995), 59 
(Decision II/10); the programme of work on marine and coastal biodiversity annexed to COP CBD, Report of the Fourth 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/4/27 
(1998), 84, 85 (Decision IV/5, Annex); COP CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity at Its Seventh Meeting: VII/5 Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/5 (2004), 10 (Annex, Elaborated Programme of Work on Marine and Coastal Biological 
Diversity). 
49 COP CBD Decision IV/5 (note 48), 85 (Annex, Basic Principles). 
50 COP CBD Decision VII/5 (note 48), 14 (Operational Objective 2.1.(i) and (h)). 
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integration of climate change-related concerns into relevant national strategies.51 Particular attention 
has been paid to the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) (see also ĺArt. 211 (6)), as 
an essential component of integrated coastal management,52 DQGDVDNH\µFRQVHUYDWLRQPHDVXUH¶
under Art. 61 (2). International goals have been established to increase the coverage of MPAs, their 
effective and equitable management, their ecological representativeness and connectivity with a 
view to establishing representative networks.53 7RWKHVHHQGV&%'SDUWLHVKDYHDGRSWHGµ6FLHQWLILF
Criteria for Identifying Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas in Need of Protection 
in Open-Ocean Waters and Deep-6HD+DELWDWV¶DQGµ6FLHQWLILF*XLGDQFHfor Selecting Areas to 
Establish a Representative Network of Marine Protected Areas, Including in Open-Ocean Waters 
and Deep-6HD+DELWDWV¶54 supporting the involvement of indigenous and local communities in the 
establishment and management of MPAs and the integration of their traditional knowledge.55 The 
international community, however, is still elaborating clarifications on the objective and 
management of MPAs for fisheries purposes.56 
20 In addition, the ecosystem approach57 (ĺ$UW as elaborated under the CBD entails 
a management process aimed at integrating management of land, water and living resources, and 
promoting conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way. This is also a social process: 
different interested communities must be involved through the development of efficient and 
effective structures and processes for decision-making and management.58 Within this process, 
traditional knowledge of local and indigenous communities should also be integrated.59 Along 
similar lines, the FAO Code of Conduct calls upon States to seek to identify relevant domestic 
parties that have a legitimate interest in the use and management of fisheries resources and establish 
arrangements for consulting them to gain their collaboration in achieving responsible fisheries.60 
The participatory aspect of the ecosystem approach thus allows for the implementation of relevant 
international human rights obligations of coastal States, namely their obligation to ensure early and 
meaningful participation of concerned indigenous and local communities in decision-making 
processes on the conservation of traditional marine fishing grounds or that may affect traditional 
                                                          
51 COP CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Tenth 
Meeting: X/29. Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/29 (2010), 2 (para. 7); GA Res. 
65/37 of 7 December 2010, para. 3. 
52 See discussion in Tanaka (note 7), 182-DQGWKHDXWKRU¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµ03$VDUHQRWDWRROIRULQWHJUDWHGFRDVWDO
PDQDJHPHQWEXWWKHLQWHJUDWHGPDQDJHPHQWDSSURDFKLVQHHGHGIRUWKHSURSHUPDQDJHPHQWRI03$V¶WRHQVXUH
compatibility and effectiveness of MPAs, freedom of navigation and fisheries regulation, ibid., 197. 
53 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (note 35), 25 (para. 32 (c)); see also 
Decision VII/5 (note 48), 3-4 (paras. 18-19); see also COP CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Tenth Meeting: Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 
and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2 (2010), 9 (Annex, Target 11). 
54 COP CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at 
Its Eleventh Meeting: Decision IX/20. Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/20 (2008), 11 (Annex II); acknowledged in GA Res. 65/37 of 7 December 2010, 
para. 180. )RUDGLVFXVVLRQ'DQLHOD'L]µ0DULQHELRGLYHUVLW\XQUDYHOOLQJWKHLQWULFDFLHVRIJOREDO
IUDPHZRUNVDQGDSSOLFDEOHFRQFHSWV¶LQ(0RUJHUDDQG-5D]]DTXHHGVEncyclopedia of Environmental 
Law: Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law (forth 2016). 
55 COP CBD Decision IX/20 (note 54), 5 (paras. 26-27). 
56 See e.g. GA Res. 65/37 of 7 December 2010, para. 123. 
57 For further information, cf. infra, MN 26-27. 
58 COP CBD Decision X/29 (note 51), 4 (para. 13(h)) and 15 (Annex, lit. d). 
59 Art. 8 (j) CBD; see also Art. 12.12 FAO Code of Conduct. 
60 Art. 7.1.2 FAO Code of Conduct. 
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fishing practices or their rights.61  
6. Best Available Scientific Evidence and the Precautionary Principle 
21 Another important factor to be taken into account by the coastal State is scientific 
information about the state of fish stocks in its waters. Scientific information is clearly critical to the 
making of decisions about the conservation and management of fish stocks. Art. 61 (2) (cf. also ĺ
$UWDUHTXLUHVWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHµEHVWDYDLODEOHVFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFH
DYDLODEOHWRLW¶62 in designing its conservation and management measures. While Art. 61 (2) does 
not positively require coastal States to undertake scientific research (ĺ Part XIII), it has been 
DUJXHGWKDWWKHSULPDU\REOLJDWLRQWRFRQVHUYHOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVLQWKH((=µUHDsonably imposes the 
EXUGHQRIDFTXLULQJGDWDWKDWPDNHWKLVREOLJDWLRQDFKLHYDEOH¶63  
22 The requirement to take into account scientific evidence does not prevent a coastal State from 
adopting a precautionary approach to fisheries conservation and management. It is arguable that the 
precautionary approach is today a generally accepted principle of international law.64 This principle 
has been incorporated in many fisheries instruments adopted since the 1982 Convention, as well as 
by the CBD Conference of the Parties in relation to marine biological diversity.65 The General 
Assembly, which is the one of the principal international institution that reviews implementation of 
the EEZ fisheries provisions,66 also periodically recalls the importance of a precautionary approach 
to EEZ fisheries.67 $FFRUGLQJWRWKHEHVWNQRZQIRUPXODWLRQRIWKHSUHFDXWLRQDU\DSSURDFKµZKHUH
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective meDVXUHVWRSUHYHQWHQYLURQPHQWDOGHJUDGDWLRQ¶68 It 
follows that it is not necessary to have scientific proof that a fish stock is overexploited prior to 
taking conservation and management measures. According to the precautionary approach, it is 
better to act earlier in order to prevent any irreversible harm to the fish stock, including by halting 
fishing activities.69 
23 Notably, international standards have provided detailed guidance on how to apply the 
precautionary principle to fisheries management through WKHFRQFHSWRIµUHIHUHQFHSRLQWV¶
                                                          
61 Art. 27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA 
Res. 61/295 of 13 September 2007 (universally endorsed); UNCED, The Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/REV.1 (1992), ILM 31, 874 (Rio Declaration), Principle 22; Agenda 21, Ch. 
17.82 (b) and 17.83; Art. 6.18 FAO Code of Conduct. See discussion by Markowski (note 26), 83-90. 
62 Cf. also Franckx on Art. 234 for the same term used in another context.  
63 William T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond (1994), 57. 
64 ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area $GYLVRU\ 2SLQLRQ RI  )HEUXDU\  SDUD  µThe Chamber observes that the 
precautionary approach has been incorporated into a growing number of international treaties and other instruments, many 
of which reflect the formulation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. In the view of the Chamber, this has initiated a trend 
WRZDUGV PDNLQJ WKLV DSSURDFK SDUW RI FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶ DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf. For the precautionary 
approach/principle as codified in UNCLOS, see also Tanaka on Art. 1; Czybulka on Art. 192. 
65 &23&%''HFLVLRQ,9QRWH$QQH[SDUDµ7KHSUHFDXWLRQDU\DSSURDFKDVVHWRXWLQGHFLVLRQ,,
DQQH[,,SDUDJUDSKDVKRXOGEHXVHGDVDJXLGDQFHIRUDOODFWLYLWLHVDIIHFWLQJPDULQHDQGFRDVWDOELRORJLFDOGLYHUVLW\¶. 
66 Barnes (note 31), 258-259. 
67 *$5HVRI'HFHPEHUSDUDFDOOVXSRQµDOO6WDWHVGLUHFWO\RUWKURXJKUHJLRQDOILVKHULHVPDQDJHPHQW
organizations and arrangements, to apply widely, in accordance with international law and the Code, the precautionary 
approaFKDQGWKHHFRV\VWHPDSSURDFK¶ 
68 Principle 15 Rio Declaration. 
69 Markowski (note 26), 43-50. 
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5HIHUHQFHSRLQWVµLGHQWLI\WKHVDIHELRORJLFDOOLPLWIRUKDUYHVWLQJDQGRWKHUUHOHYDQWFRQVWUDLQWV¶70 
7KH)$2GLIIHUHQWLDWHVEHWZHHQµFRQFHSWXDO¶UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVWKDWFDSWXUHLQEURDGWHUPVWKH
management objective for WKHILVKHU\DQGµWHFKQLFDO¶UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVZKLFKFDQEHFDOFXODWHGRU
quantified on the basis of biological or economic characteristics of the fishery; as well as between 
µWDUJHW¶UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVLQGLFDWLQJDVWDWHRIDILVKLQJDQGRUUHVRXUFHZKLFKLs considered to be 
desirable and at which management action, whether during development or stock rebuilding, should 
DLPIURPµOLPLW¶UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVLQGLFDWLQJDVWDWHRIDILVKHU\DQGRUDUHVRXUFHZKLFKLV
considered to be undesirable and which management action should avoid.71 The FAO Code of 
&RQGXFWRQ5HVSRQVLEOH)LVKHULHVFDOOVXSRQ6WDWHVWRDSSO\µZLGHO\¶WKHSUHFDXWLRQDU\DSSURDFKWR
fisheries conservation and management, by taking into account 
µXQFHUWDLQWLHVUHODWLQJWRWKHVL]HDQGSURGXFWLYLW\Rf the stocks, reference points, stock condition in relation to 
such reference points, levels and distribution of fishing mortality and the impact of fishing activities, 
including discards, on non-target and associated or dependent species, as well as environmental and socio-
HFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQV¶72  
The Code also calls for including the need to determine target reference points and stock-specific 
limit reference points with a view to determining in advance conservation measures if reference 
points are exceeded and limit reference points approaches, and to applying these measures 
automatically.73 
24 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) contains an obligation on coastal States to apply 
the precautionary approach widely to the conservation, management and exploitation of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks found within their EEZ.74 Annex II UNFSA contains 
guidelines for application of the precautionary approach through the identification of two types of 
precautionary reference points: on the one KDQG6WDWHVDUHWRGHWHUPLQHµFRQVHUYDWLRQ¶RUµOLPLW¶
reference points, which set boundaries for safe biological limits within which the stock can produce 
06<DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGµPDQDJHPHQW¶RUµWDUJHW¶UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVWKDWDUHLQWHQGHGWR
represent management objectives.75 Against this background, the guidelines require States to ensure 
that the risk of exceeding conservation reference points is very low and that management reference 
points are not exceeded on average.76 When reference points are approached, they should not be 
exceeded; and if they are exceeded, States are mandated to take measures without delay for 
restoring stocks.77 In addition, if a natural event adversely affects the status of stocks, States are 
required to adopt temporary emergency measures in order to avoid worsening the situation by over-
fishing an affected stock.78 ,QUHODWLRQWRH[SORUDWRU\ILVKHULHVµFDXWLRXVFRQVHUYDWLRQDQG
PDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHV¶DUHWRUHPDLQLQIRUFHXQWLOVXIILFLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQKDVEHHQDFTXLUHGWR
permit a proper assessment of the impact of fishing upon the long-term sustainability of the 
                                                          
70 Birnie/Boyle/ Redgwell (note 6), 675. 
71 John F. Caddy/Rubin Mahon, Reference Points for Fisheries Management: FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 347 
(1995). 
72 Arts. 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 FAO Code of Conduct. 
73 Art. 7.5.3 FAO Code of Conduct; see also Moore (note 44), 97. 
74 Art. 6 UNFSA. See also the discussion on the relevance of the UNFSA for the interpretation of the Convention in 
Harrison/Morgera on Art. 63 MN 8.  
75 Moritaka Hayashi, The Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Hey (note 4), 55, 60. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Art. 6 (4) UNFSA. 
78 Art. 6 (7) UNFSA. 
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stocks.79 7KHSUHFDXWLRQDU\SULQFLSOHDVDSSOLHGLQWKH81)6$LVWKXVQRWDQµDEVROXWLVWFRQFHSW¶
EXWUDWKHUFDOOVIRUVWRFNPDQDJHPHQWWREHKDQGOHGµLQDSUHFDXWLRQDU\PDQQHU¶E\WDNLQJLQWR
account uncertainties related to size and productivity of fish stocks, levels and distribution of fish 
mortality, and the impact of fishing activities on associated or dependent species, including existing 
and predicted environmental and socio-economic conditions,80 without automatically preventing 
fishing once reference points are reached. This determination thus remains to be made on an ad hoc 
basis.81 
25 $JDLQVWWKLVEDFNGURSWKHQRWLRQRIµEHVW¶VFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFHIRXQGLQ$UWVXJJHVWVWKDW
States are under a duty to keep their conservation and management measures under review on the 
basis of the most up-to-date scientific evidence that is available to them. This means that 
precautionary measures are temporary and they must be kept under review by the coastal State. 
Thus, if additional scientific evidence concerning the conservation status of a stock comes to light, 
States must consider adapting or changing their conservation and management measures in light of 
WKHVHQHZILQGLQJV7KLVLVLQOLQHZLWKWKHHFRV\VWHPDSSURDFKDQGLWVVXSSRUWIRUµDGDSWLYH
PDQDJHPHQW¶based on environmental impact assessment, impact management, and the proactive 
identification and management of gaps in knowledge with a view to fuelling a process of 
continuous learning.82 Contracting parties to the CBD are specifically called upon to undertake 
environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments to further strengthen 
sustainable use of living resources in areas within national jurisdiction.83 
7. Exchange of Available Scientific Information 
26 In addition to the need for the coastal State to conduct its own research into fish stocks in its 
EEZ in order to gather relevant scientific evidence for the purposes of Art. 61, Art. 62 (4)(f) of the 
Convention permits the coastal State to require foreign vessels fishing in its EEZ to conduct 
specified fisheries research programmes. However, scientific evidence may also come from other 
sources such as research conducted by another State, inter-governmental organizations or non-
governmental organizations. To ensure that States have access to a wide range of scientific sources, 
Art. 61 (5) calls for the regular exchange of available scientific information, catch and fishing effort 
statistics and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks through competent international 
organizations. The importance of the enhanced collection and sharing of fisheries data was also 
stressed in Agenda 21.84 
8. Cooperation with Competent Organizations 
27 Art. 61 points to two instances of cooperation with competent international organizations: 
in the adoption of proper conservation and management measures to avoid over-exploitation (Art. 
                                                          
79 Art. 6 (6) UNFSA. 
80 Art. 6 (3)(c) UNFSA. 
81 David Freestone, Implementing Precaution Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Hey (note 4), 287, 320-321. 
82 COP CBD, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000), 103 (Decision V/6) and COP CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Seventh Meeting: VII/11 Ecosystem Approach, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/11 (2004). 
83 COP CBD Decision X/29 (note 51), 4 (para. 13(h)). 
84 Agenda 21, Ch. 17.87. 
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61 (2)) and in relation to the exchange of available scientific information (Art. 61 (5)). In both 
cases, the Convention foresees the possibility for relevant organizations to operate at the global, 
regional or sub-regional level. The most notable global organization is the FAO, which performs 
both normative and technical activities that can support member countries in the conservation of 
living resources, and also provides statistical and other data on fish stocks and fishing efforts. In 
fact, the FAO Constitution specifically requires member States to communicate to the Organization 
all official reports and statistics concerning fisheries,85 thereby allowing the FAO to undertake the 
worldwide collection, compilation, analysis and diffusion of data and information in fisheries and 
aquaculture. In addition, the FAO has supported the strengthening of national capacity in the 
collecting, analysis and use of accurate, reliable and timely data, as well as cooperated in 
international efforts directed towards the development of standard concepts, definitions, 
classifications and methodologies for the collection and collation of fishery statistics.86 Regional 
fisheries management organizations87 have also, within their area of competence, contributed to the 
collection and exchange of scientific information. 
9. Associated Species 
28 Art. 61 is not solely concerned with the conservation of target species. Coastal States are 
also obliged to take into account the effect of fishing on associated or dependent species (ĺ$UW
(4)7KHVHZRUGVKDYHEHHQFULWLFL]HGDVµ>KDYLQJ@QRILUPJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHGXVDJHDQG>EHLQJ@
YDJXHLQQDWXUH¶88 and for qualifying these aspects as mere considerations subject to use concerns.89 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that they should be interpreted broadly, particularly in light of the 
REOLJDWLRQIRXQGLQ3DUW;,,RIWKH&RQYHQWLRQZKHUHE\6WDWHVPXVWWDNHPHDVXUHVWRµSURWHFWDQG
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered 
VSHFLHVDQGRWKHUIRUPVRIPDULQHOLIH¶ĺArt. 194 (5)).90 In other words, it can generally be said 
that the coastal State must apply the ecosystem approach to its conservation and management 
measures. This position is supported by interpreting the Convention in light of other developments 
in international environmental law. In particular, the ecosystem approach to marine resource 
management is recommended in consensus decisions adopted by the CBD Conference of the 
Parties,91 notably the CBD work programme on marine and coastal biodiversity which calls for the 
identification of key variables or interactions, for the purpose of assessing and monitoring: first, 
components of biological diversity; second, the sustainable use of such components; and, third, 
ecosystem effects92 The ecosystem approach is also stressed by the FAO Code of Conduct93 and 
                                                          
85 Arts. XI (5) and XVI Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 16 October 1945, 
available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/022/k8024e.pdf. 
86 For further information, cf. the website of the FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department which provides statistics and 
information on fisheries: http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/2017/en. 
87 See for an overview on fishery organizations specialized in migratory species, Owen on Annex I. 
88 Attard (note 30), 154. 
89 Barnes (note 31), 244. 
90 Markowski (note 26), 30-31. 
91 COP CBD Decision IV/5 (note 48), 84, 85 (Annex, para. 2). 
92 Ibid. 
93 FAO, International Guidelines on Bycatch Management and Reduction of Discards (2011), 13 (para. 7.3). The Guidelines 
were endorsed by the FAO Committee on Fisheries at its 29th session in February 2011, see FAO, Report of the Twenty-
Ninth Session of the Committee on Fisheries, FAO Doc. FIPI/R973 (2011), 8-9 (para. 50). 
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was adopted as a global goal by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.94 The 
principle is elaborated in other more specific instruments such as the International Plan of Action on 
Seabirds and the International Plan of Action on Bycatch and Discards. These instruments would 
qualify as generally recommended international minimum standards and they need to be taken into 
account by coastal States in accordance with Art. 61 (3). 
29 One practical outcome of the ecosystem approach is that the coastal State may set an 
allowable catch not only for species which are directly targeted by a fishery, but also for associated 
species or so-called by-FDWFK7RWKLVHQG$UWPDQGDWHVFRDVWDO6WDWHVWRµWDNHLQWR
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶HIIHFWVRQDVVRFLDWHGRUGHSHQGHQWVSHFLHVµZLWKDYLHZWRPDQDJLQJRUUHVWRULQJ
populations of [these] species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously 
WKUHDWHQHG¶7KLVSRVLWLRQLVVXSSRUWHGE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO*XLGHOLQHVRQ%\FDWFK0DQDJHPHQWDQG
5HGXFWLRQRI'LVFDUGVZKLFKOLVWVµOLPLWVDQGRUTXRWDVRQE\FDWFKHV¶DPRQJVWWKHPHDVXUHVWKDW
can be taken by States in this regard.95 The UN General Assembly has urgently called upon States 
WRµGHYHORSDQGLPSOHPHQWHIIHFWLYHPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHVWRUHGXFHWKHLQFLGHQFHRIFDWFKRIQRQ-
target species, including utilization of selective fishing gear, where aSSURSULDWH¶96 Parties to the 
Convention on Migratory Species urged to assess the risk of bycatch arising from their gillnet 
fisheries, as it relates to migratory species, and increase efforts to collaborate with regional fisheries 
management organizations (RFMOs) in this regard97 and they have also adopted action plans with 
the aim of reducing bycatch in relation to specific migratory species, including sharks98 and sea 
turtles.99  
10. Outlook 
30 $OWKRXJKLQWHUQDWLRQDOPRQLWRULQJRIFRDVWDO6WDWHV¶LPSOHPHQWDWion of Art. 61 has not been 
very systematic, in 2010 CBD parties established a global target that may contribute to closer 
international scrutiny of State practice in this respect: the target provides that by 2020 all fish is 
managed and harvested sustainably, legally and applying the ecosystem approach, so that 
overfishing is avoided, recovery plans and measures are in place for all depleted species, fisheries 
have no significant adverse impacts on threatened species and vulnerable ecosystems and the 
impacts of fisheries on stocks, species and ecosystems are within safe ecological limits.100 To this 
end, CBD parties are called upon to ensure the sustainability of fisheries, by managing the impacts 
of fisheries on species and the wider ecosystem through implementing the ecosystem approach; 
minimizing the detrimental impacts of fishing practices; mitigating and managing by-catches 
sustainably and reducing discards, in order to attain a sustainable exploitation level of marine 
                                                          
94 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (note 35), 23 (para. 30(d)) and follow-up by 
GA Res. 65/37 of 7 December 2010, para. 111. 
95 COP CBD Decision V/6 (note 82); COP CBD Decision VII/11 (note 82). 
96 GA Res. 66/68 of 6 December 2008, para. 84. 
97 COP CMS, Bycatch of CMS-Listed Species in Gillnet Fisheries, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 10.14 (2011) 
98 See COP CMS, Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks, UNEP Doc. 
CMS/Sharks/Outcome 1.2 (2012), Annex 3 (Conservation Plan). 
99 See Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the 
Indian Ocean and South-East Asia Conservation and Management Plan (2009); Conservation and Management Plan for 
Marine Turtles of the Atlantic Coast of Africa (2008); Single Species Action Plan for the Loggerhead Turtle (Caretta 
caretta) in the South Pacific Ocean (2014). 
100 COP CBD Decision X/2 (note 53), 6 (Annex). 
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fishery resources and thereby contributing to a good environmental status in marine and coastal 
waters; and integrating climate change considerations in that context.101 
                                                          
101 COP CBD Decision X/29 (note 51), 12-13 (paras. 64-65, 67). 
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Article 62 
Utilization of the living resources 
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources 
in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the 
terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to 
the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 
and 70, especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein. 
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the coastal 
State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the 
living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other 
national interests, the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the requirements of developing States 
in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize 
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which 
have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. 
4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the 
conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws and 
regulations of the coastal State. These laws and regulations shall be consistent with this 
Convention and may relate, inter alia, to the following: 
(a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, including payment of fees and other 
forms of remuneration, which, in the case of developing coastal States, may consist of 
adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and technology relating to the 
fishing industry; 
(b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of catch, whether in 
relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per vessel over a period of time or to 
the catch by nationals of any State during a specified period; 
(c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount of gear, and the types, 
sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used; 
(d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be caught; 
(e) specifying information required of fishing vessels, including catch and effort statistics and 
vessel position reports; 
(f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal State, the conduct of specified 
fisheries research programmes and regulating the conduct of such research, including the 
sampling of catches, disposition of samples and reporting of associated scientific data; 
(g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by the coastal State; 
(h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of the coastal State; 
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(i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other cooperative arrangements; 
(j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries technology, 
including enhancement of the coastal State's capability of undertaking fisheries research; 
(k) enforcement procedures. 
5. Coastal States shall give due notice of conservation and management laws and regulations. 
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µ1DWLRQDOVRIRWKHU6WDWHV>«@VKDOOFRPSO\ZLWK>«@ODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV¶ 23 
I. Purpose and Function 
1 $UWSURYLGHVFRPSOHPHQWDU\REOLJDWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHH[HUFLVHRIFRDVWDO6WDWHV¶
sovereign rights for the purpose of sustainably managing the living natural resources in the 
H[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF=RQH((=ĺ$UWD:KLOVW$UWVHWVRXWWKHREOLJDWLRQWR
conserve fish stocks, Art. 62 focuses on economic and equitable considerations arising from the 
recognition that fish are a valuable resource which should not be squandered. It was a common 
SRVLWLRQDW81&/26,,,WKDWµ>W@KHZDVWHRIELRORJLFDOUHVRXUFHVZKLFKZRXOGUHVXOWIURP
[excluding other non-coastal States from fishing in the EEZ] could not be justified at a time when 
there was a world shortDJHRISURWHLQ¶1 Since the conclusion of UNCLOS, fish has become an even 
more important source of food for many people. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), marine capture fisheries provided about 115 million tonnes of fish for human 
FRQVXPSWLRQLQDQGµ>J@OREDOO\ILVKSURYLGHVPRUHWKDQELOOLRQSHRSOHZLWKDOPRVW
percent of their average per capita intake of animal protein, and 3.0 billion people with at least 15 
SHUFHQWRIVXFKSURWHLQ¶2 It is therefore vital that the fisheries regime continues to allow people to 
have access to this source of nutrition. It is this purpose which is served by the concept of optimum 
utilization. 
2 The underlying function of Art. 62 is to allow other States to have access to fish stocks if 
the coastal State cannot harvest those stocks itself. It therefore acts as a balance against the 
allocation of EEZs to coastal States37KHREMHFWLYHRIRSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQLVµZLWKRXWSUHMXGLFH¶WR
Art. 61 which means that this objective does not remove the need for a State to set an allowable 
catch based upon, inter alia, the conservation status of a fish stock. Rather Art. 62 regulates access 
to the allowable catch. Art. 62 introduces an obligation for the coastal State to calculate its own 
harvesting capacity in order to determine whether there is a surplus in the allowable catch. Art. 62 
then indicates both the way in which the coastal State should allocate the surplus of the allowable 
catch and the conditions which may be attached to access to living resources in its EEZ. Art. 62 
must be read in connection with Arts. 69 and 70 which deal with the particular rights of land-locked 
and geographically disadvantaged States in relation to the living resources of the EEZ. 
II. Historical Background 
3 The provisions on access to fish stocks and the allocation of fishing rights developed 
alongside the general framework for fisheries management in the EEZ.4 Once it had been agreed 
that coastal States would have certain rights to manage fish stocks in their adjacent waters, it 
became necessary to address the extent of those rights and whether other States would have any 
access to fish in the EEZ at all. As noted above, many States were concerned about the need to 
maximize catches in order to satisfy rising demands for food. An early proposal by the United 
States thus provided that  
µLQRUGHUWRDVVXUHWKHPD[LPXPXWLOL]DWLRQDQGHTXLWDEOHDOORFDWLRQRIFRDVWDODQGDQDGURPRXV
UHVRXUFHVWKHFRDVWDO6WDWH>«@PD\UHVHUYHWRLWVIODJYHVVHOVWKDWSRUWLRQRIWKHDOORZDEOH annual 
                                                          
1 Statement of Lapointe (Canada), Second Committee UNCLOS III, 29th Meeting, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29 (1974), 
OR II, 224, 225. See also FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation on the Conditions of Access to the Fish Resources of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, Doc. FIPP/R293 (1983), para. 10. 
2 FAO, State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2010), 3. 
3 For further information, see Proelss on Art. 56 MN XX.  
4 For further information on the development of fisheries in the EEZ, cf. Harrison/Morgera on Art. 61 MN 5 et seq.  
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catch they can harvest [and] the coastal State shall provide access by other States, under reasonable 
FRQGLWLRQVWRWKDWSRUWLRQRIWKHUHVRXUFHVQRWIXOO\XWLOL]HGE\LWVYHVVHOV>«@¶5 
Whilst there was little disagreement amongst delegates over the principle of access for other States 
to the surplus of the allowable catch, there were divergent opinions on which States should have 
access to fish stocks and whether the Convention should establish a system of hierarchy. The US 
proposal cited above pURSRVHGWKDWSULRULW\VKRXOGEHJLYHQWRµ6WDWHVWKDWKDYHWUDGLWLRQDOO\ILVKHG
IRUDUHVRXUFH¶IROORZHGE\µRWKHU6WDWHVLQWKHUHJLRQSDUWLFXODUO\ODQGORFNHG6WDWHVDQGRWKHU
States with limited access to the resources, with whom joint or reciprocal arrangements had been 
PDGH¶6 Thus, they sought to preserve the status quo prior to the establishment of the EEZ, 
including their own distant-water fishing fleet. Unsurprisingly, this position was shared by other 
States which had traditionally engaged in distant water fishing activities. For instance, the Eastern 
(XURSHDQ6RFLDOLVW6WDWHVVXJJHVWHGWKDWSULRULW\VKRXOGEHJLYHQWRµ>6@WDWHVZKLFKKDYHERUQH
considerable material and other costs of research, discovery, identification and exploitation of living 
UHVRXUFHVWRFNVRUZKLFKKDYHEHHQILVKLQJLQWKHUHJLRQLQYROYHG¶IROORZHGE\µGHYHORSLQJ
countries, land-locked countries, countries with narrow access to the sea or with narrow continental 
VKHOYHVDQGFRXQWULHVZLWKYHU\OLPLWHGOLYLQJUHVRXUFHV¶ZLWK DQ\RWKHUVXUSOXVJRLQJWRµDOORWKHU
6WDWHVZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶7 In contrast, other States proposed giving priority to developing 
land-locked States and geographically disadvantaged States.8 The compromise position that was 
adopted in the negotiatinJWH[WUHTXLUHGWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHWRµWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWDOOUHOHYDQWIDFWRUV¶
albeit with no particular priority.9 However, not all States were satisfied with this compromise and 
the issue remained a point of controversy on the agenda of the Conference. 
4 The negotiation of Art. 62 was closely connected with the question of the rights of land-
ORFNHGDQGJHRJUDSKLFDOO\GLVDGYDQWDJHG6WDWHVPRUHJHQHUDOO\ĺ$UW$UW$VWKHLVVXH
remained unresolved by the seventh session of the Conference in 1978, it was sent to a special 
negotiating group under the chairmanship of SATYA NANDAN of Fiji. He proposed an amendment 
WRWKHGUDIWWH[WRI$UWSURYLGLQJWKDWWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHVKRXOGKDYHµSDUWLFXODUUHJDUG¶WRWKH
interests of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States, especially the developing States 
in those categories.10 The formula was inserted into the Informal Composite Negotiating Text 
(ICNT) at the eighth session of the Conference in 1978. Despite this change, the land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged States continued to express concern that the negotiating text did not 
meet their needs.11 These States made further proposals for amendment, but none of them gained 
sufficient support to justify altering the draft negotiating text. By this stage modifications to the 
,&17FRXOGRQO\EHPDGHLIWKH\EHQHILWHGIURPµZLGHVSUHDGDQGVXEVWDQWLDOVXSSRUWSUHYDLOLQJLQ
WKH3OHQDU\¶12 Whilst minor drafting changes were made to what would become Art. 62 in the final 
                                                          
5 Sea-Bed Committee, United States: Revised Draft Fisheries Article, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.9 (1972), 2. 
6 Ibid. See also Second Committee UNCLOS III, United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic 
Zone and the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (1974), OR III, 222. 
7 Second Committee UNCLOS III, Bulgaria et al.: Draft Articles on the Economic Zone, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38 
(1974), OR III, 214-216. 
8 See Myron H. Nordquist/Satya N. Nandan/Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, vol. II (1993), 627. 
9 UNCLOS III, Informal Single Negotiating Text (Part II), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/PART II (1975), OR IV, 152, 160 
(Article 51). 
10 UNCLOS III, Reports of the Committees and Negotiating Groups on Negotiations at the Resumed Seventh Session, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.62/RCNG/1 (1978), OR X, 88 (Explanatory Memorandum on the Proposals (NG4/9/Rev.2) by the 
Chairman of Negotiating Group 4 ± Ambassador Satya Nandan). 
11 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 8), 633-634. 
12 UNCLOS III, Organization of Work: Decisions Taken by the Conference at its 90th Meeting on the Report of the 
General Committee, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (1978), OR IX, 6, 8 (para. 10). 
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sessions of the Conference, the substance of this provision reflected the compromise that had been 
suggested by NANDAN in 1978. 
III. Elements 
µ7KHFRDVWDO6WDWHVKDOOSURPRWHWKHRSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQ¶ 
5 The laconic provision in Art. 62 (1) clarifies that coastal States have an obligation to 
SURPRWHWKHREMHFWLYHRIµRSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQ¶RIWKHOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVLQWKH((=7KHWHUP
µRSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQ¶LVQRWH[SUHVVO\Gefined by the Convention. Considering the provision in its 
context, however, it is clear that this phrase is not to be interpreted as the full utilization of the 
resource.13 Rather, the language of Art. 62 makes clear that it is subordinated to Art. 61 and it 
IROORZVWKDWµRSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRWKHRSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQRIWKHDOORZDEOHFDWFKZKLFKKDV
been set in accordance with Art. 61. Thus, Art. 62 does not override the obligation on the coastal 
State to pursue the objective of promoting the maximum sustainable yield.  
µVKDOOGHWHUPLQHLWVFDSDFLW\WRKDUYHVW>«@DFFHVVWRWKHVXUSOXV¶ 
6 $FFRUGLQJWR$UWµWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHVKDOOGHWHUPLQHLWVFDSDFLW\WRKDUYHVWWKHOLYLQJ
UHVRXUFHVRIWKHH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQH¶DQGµZKHUH>LW@GRHVQot have the capacity to harvest the 
HQWLUHDOORZDEOHFDWFK¶LWVKDOOµJLYHRWKHU6WDWHVDFFHVVWRWKHVXUSOXVRIWKHDOORZDEOHFDWFK¶7KH
calculation of the surplus is therefore critical for the application of the provisions relating to the idea 
of optimum utilization and the allocation of fishing rights in the EEZ to other States. 
7 Whilst there is a definite obligation on a coastal State to determine its capacity to harvest 
the living resources of the EEZ, it would appear that the coastal State has a broad discretion in 
GRLQJVR7KHFRQFHSWRIµKDUYHVWLQJFDSDFLW\¶LVOHIWXQGHILQHGE\WKH&RQYHQWLRQ3HUKDSVWKH
most obvious way of calculating harvesting capacity is by reference to those nationals of the coastal 
State involved in harvesting fish stocks in the EEZ. Nationals clearly include natural persons but it 
PD\DOVREHLQWHUSUHWHGWRLQFOXGHILVKLQJYHVVHOVIODJJHGLQWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHĺ$UW
regardless of the nationality of the crew.14 The consequence of this wider interpretation is that it 
opens up the possibility for a coastal State to artificially increase its harvesting capacity by allowing 
nationals of another State to fish in vessels flying their flag. Yet, such a practice would be 
completely in accordance with international law. For example, in the Dispute Concerning Filleting 
within the Gulf of Lawrence, the arbitral tribunal held that  
µWKHULJKWIRUD6WDWHWRGHWHUPLQHWKURXJKLWVOHJLVODWLRQWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHUHJLVWHULQJRIVKLSVLQJHQHUDO
and fishing vessels in particular falls within the sole competence of the said State, to the extent that there is a 
substantial link between the State and the ship and that the State of the flag actually exercises its jurisdiction 
DQGFRQWURORYHUWKHVKLSVIO\LQJLWVIODJ¶15 
In that case, the tribunal refused to look beyond the fact of registration to determine the origins of 
the vessel. More recently, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has confirmed in The 
09µ6DLJD¶1R&DVH that  
                                                          
13 David Freestone, Implementing Precaution Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Ellen Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (1999), 287, 301. 
14 This is the interpretation of nationals adopted in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, cf. LWV$UWµWKHWHUP³QDWLRQDOV´PHDQVILVKLQJERDWVRUFUDIWRIDQ\VL]HKDYLQJWKH
nationality of the State concerned, according to the law of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the members of their 
FUHZV¶ 
15 Dispute Concerning Filleting in the Gulf of St Lawrence (France v. Canada), Award of 17 July 1986, ILR 82, 590 (para. 
27). 
25 
 
 Harrison/Morgera  
µWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH&Rnvention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its flag 
State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria by 
reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag StDWHPD\EHFKDOOHQJHGE\RWKHU6WDWHV¶16  
In other words, genuine link does not require the vessel to be owned or operated by a national of the 
flag State. It follows that  
µHDFKFRDVWDO>6@WDWHLVIUHHWRLQWURGXFHIRUHLJQFDSLWDODQGWRREWDLQWHFKQLFDOassistance from foreign 
nations, and it is also free to allow any foreign nations or foreign enterprises it chooses to engage in fishing 
activities through concessionary agreements and to secure the maximum of the total allowable catch for 
itself.¶17  
ODA hDVFULWLFL]HGWKLVDVSHFWRI$UWEHFDXVHµWKHSULQFLSOHRIDFFHVV>@WRWKHVXUSOXVZLOO
HYHQWXDOO\EHFRPHPHDQLQJOHVV¶18 The only apparent restriction on the coastal State is that it acts in 
JRRGIDLWKĺ$UW19, although it must be asked whether or not this is a sufficient safeguard 
against abuse of the right by coastal States. 
8 It is not only commercial fisheries which must be taken into account when calculating the 
harvesting capacity. Indeed, international law may require coastal States to take particular care to 
protect subsistence fisheries. According to the FAO Code of Conduct20, States are called upon to 
µJXDUDQWHHZKHUHDSSURSULDWHSUHIHUHQWLDODFFHVVWRVXEVLVWHQFHDUWLVDQDODQGVPDOO-scale fisherman 
WRWUDGLWLRQDOILVKLQJJURXQGV¶21 Furthermore, taking into account human rights instruments and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, States must arguably ensure that indigenous peoples and local 
communities benefit from the management system and are allocated a fair share of fishing rights in 
order to adequately protect subsistence fishing activities and sustainable customary practices.22 
Some States have adopted legislation which explicitly accords fishing rights to subsistence fishing 
communities.23 
9 It appears that a coastal State can make a unilateral determination of its harvesting capacity 
and there is no right for other States to participate in this process.24 Nor is this likely to be an issue 
WKDWFDQEHFKDOOHQJHGXQGHUWKHGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWSURFHGXUHVLQWKH&RQYHQWLRQĺ3DUW;9) as 
Art. 297 (3)(a) provides that  
                                                          
16 ITLOS, 7KH09µ6DLJD¶1R&DVH (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgement of 1 July 1999, ITLOS 
Reports (1999), 10, para. 83 
17 Shigeru Oda, Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, AJIL 77 (1983), 739, 734. See also 
David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (1987), 159-160. 
18 Ibid., 744.  
19 See also Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence QRWHSDUDµ,WVKRXOGWKHUHIRUHEH
concluded that the registration of trawlers referred to in Art. 4(b) [of the 1972 Treaty between Canada and France], 
effected in conformity with the provisions of French legislation, was considered by the Parties, together with the principle 
of good faith which is of necessity a principal factor in the performance of treaties, as affording a sufficient guarantee 
DJDLQVWDQ\ULVNRIWKH)UHQFK3DUW\H[HUFLVLQJLWVULJKWVDEXVLYHO\¶6HHDOVRAttard (note 17), 160. 
20 FAO, Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries (1995) 
21 Art. 6.18 FAO Code of Conduct. 
22 Art. 1 (2) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Art. 26 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295 of 13 September 2007; FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Small-scale 
Fisheries in the context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (2014); and Art. 10 (c) of the Convention on Biological 
'LYHUVLW\ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKDWµHDFK&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUW\VKDOODVIDUDVSRVVLEOHDQGDSSURSULDWH>«@SURWHFWDQGHQFRXUDJH
customary usage of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with 
conservatioQRUVXVWDLQDEOHXVHUHTXLUHPHQWV¶6HHGLVFXVVLRQLQ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, UN 
Doc A/67/268 (2012) and Marion Markowski, The International Law of EEZ Fisheries (2010), 89-90 and 100-101. 
23 6HH6RXWK$IULFD¶V0DULQH/LYLQJ5esources Act 1998, as discussed in Emma Witbooi, Fishing Rights: A New Dawn 
IRU6RXWK$IULFD¶V0DULQH6XEVLVWHQFH)LVKHUV2FHDQ<HDUERRN-104. 
24 Attard (note 17), 159 and 165.  
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µthe coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its 
sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, 
including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation 
of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and management laws 
DQGUHJXODWLRQV¶25 
Such disputes may only be submitted to conciliation in accordance with Annex V, Section 2 of the 
&RQYHQWLRQLILWLVDOOHJHGWKDWDFRDVWDO6WDWHKDVµDUELWUDULO\UHIXVHGWRGHWHUPLQHDWWKHUHTXHVWRI
another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living resources with respect to stocks 
ZKLFKWKDWRWKHU6WDWHLVLQWHUHVWHGLQILVKLQJ¶26 This provision confirms the broad discretion that 
coastal States have in determining their harvesting capacity, as decisions of a conciliation 
commission are not binding.27 
10 ,WDOVRHPHUJHVIURPSUDFWLFHWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIVXUSOXVPD\KDYHµSOD\HGDYHU\OLPLWHG
UROH¶DWOHDVWLQUHODWLRQWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VDFFHVVDJUHHPHQWV28: with regards to access to EU 
waters by third-country vessels, this was permitted on a reciprocal basis to maintain existing fishing 
patterns even if no surplus catch was available in EU waters; and with respect to EU vessels access 
to third-country waters, access agreements were concluded without being explicitly based on access 
to the surplus but rather other criteria.29 
µ,QJLYLQJDFFHVVWRRWKHU6WDWHV>«@WKHFRDVWDO6WDWHVKDOOWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW>«@¶ 
11 If a coastal State determines that there is a surplus, it must decide how to allocate that 
surplus to other States. In this regard, Art. 63 (3) provides that in allocating the surplus of its 
DOORZDEOHFDWFKµWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHVKDOOWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWDOOUHOHYDQWIDFWRUV¶7KHSURYLVLRQOLVWV
several such factors, including the significance of the living resources to the local economy of the 
coastal State and its other national interests, the rights of land-locked and geographically 
GLVDGYDQWDJHV6WDWHVĺ$UW$UWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIGHYHORSLQJ6WDWHVDQGWKHQHHGWR
minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or 
which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. It is clear that this list is 
illustrative and other relevant factors can be taken into account.30 Of perhaps greater significance is 
the lack of any explicit hierarchy. As noted above, several proposals were made at UNCLOS III to 
introduce a hierarchy but none were successful. The result is, in the words of one author, that the 
FRDVWDO6WDWHKDVµWKHEURDGHVWGLVFUHWLRQWRGHFLGHWRZKRPDQGXQGHU what conditions access will 
EHJUDQWHG¶31 In this regard, ORREGO VICUÑA QRWHVWKDWµLWLVSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHWKLVGLVFUHWLRQDU\
power is linked to the sovereign and exclusive nature of the coastal State's rights that the chief 
criterion that will guide the JUDQWLQJRIDFFHVVZLOOEHLWVRZQQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶32 
12 One of the effects of Art. 62 (3) is to extinguish any historical rights to fish that other States 
may have previously had in coastal waters prior to the establishment of the EEZ. This differs from 
the position adopted by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Iceland) where a condition for Iceland extending its jurisdiction was to 
                                                          
25 Emphasis added. 
26 Art. 297 (3)(b)(ii). For further information, see Serdy on Art. 297 MN XX. CROSS REF. 
27 Art. 7 (2) Annex V UNCLOS. Moreover, Art. 8 of Annex V confirms that parties to a dispute have the right to reject the 
proposals of the Conciliation Commission. 
28 Robin R. Churchill/Daniel Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy (2010), 330 
29 Ibid. 
30 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 8), 637. 
31 Francisco O. Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law (1989), 54. 
32 Ibid., 54-55. 
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recognize the rights of those States which had historically fished in the vicinity of its coast.33 In 
contrast, there is no automatic right under UNCLOS to continue fishing in waters where fishing has 
traditionally taken place. Rather, such States are but one category of States which may be permitted 
access to the surplus under Art. 62 (3). This interpretation of Art. 62 was confirmed by the Tribunal 
LQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD$UELWUDWLRQZKLFKQRWHGWKDWµWKHQRWLRQRIVRYHUHLJQULJKWVRYHUOLYLQJDQG
non-living resources is generally incompatible with another State having historic rights to the same 
UHVRXUFHV¶34 
13 The only possible indication of any hierarchy in Art. 62 (3) is the requirement that the 
FRDVWDO6WDWHVKRXOGKDYHµSDUWLFXODUUHJDUGWRWKHSURYLVLRQVRIDUWLFOHVDQGHVSHFLDOO\LQ
relation to tKHGHYHORSLQJ6WDWHVPHQWLRQHGWKHUHLQ¶$UWVDQGGHDOZLWKWKHULJKWVRIODQG-
locked and geographically disadvantaged States in relation to the living resources of the EEZ. Yet, 
the cross-reference to these provisions falls short of granting a preference to land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged States in allocating the surplus of the allowable catch. Taking into 
account the language of the provision, as well as the breadth of the discretion of coastal States, it 
would seem reasonable to conclude that  
µWKHYDULHW\RIFRQVLGHUDWLRQVZKLFKWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHPD\HQWHUWDLQLQJLYLQJRWKHU6WDWHVWKHULJKWRIDFFHVVWR
the surplus of the living resources of its exclusive economic zone confirms that this right of access is a 
UHODWLYHULJKW¶35  
Moreover, in practice, ATTARD KDVREVHUYHGWKDWµWKHUHLVQRILUPHYLGHQFHWRVXSSRUWWKLVYLHZ
that the consideration accorded to the rights of [land-locked and geographically disadvantaged 
States] referred to in Article 62 (3) is taken into account by [S@WDWHV¶36 
14 Indeed, there is a question whether the surplus must be allocated at all by the coastal State. 
7KHLQFOXVLRQRIµWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVRIWKHDUHDWRWKHHFRQRP\RIWKHFRDVWDO
6WDWH¶DVZHOODVLWVµRWKHUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV¶, in the list of factors to be taken into account by the 
coastal State suggests that there may be situations where the coastal State might legitimately decide 
not to allocate the surplus to another State, at least temporarily. It is these factors which would 
explain the practice of some States in withholding part of the allowable catch as a reserve against 
the possible increase in their harvesting capacity at a later stage in the fishing season. Whilst some 
commentators have questioned the legality of such a practice37, it can be explained on the basis of 
the importance of economic factors or other national interests which are legitimate factors for the 
coastal State to take into account in deciding how to allocate its surplus. 
15 Current practice indicates WKDWFRDVWDO6WDWHV¶ODZVGRQRWVSHFLI\DQ\IDFWRUVWREHWDNHQ
into account in allocating the surplus,38 so that it is left entirely to negotiations with States seeking 
access to the EEZ. Negotiations may take place with the flag State or in some circumstances the 
coastal State may negotiate directly with fishing operators. In the case of State-to-State 
                                                          
33 ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment of 25 July 1974, ICJ 
Reports (1974), 175, para. 61. 
34 PCA (Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII UNCLOS) The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines/China), 
Merits, Award of 12 July 2016, para. 243; available at https://pcacases.com/web/view/7. See also paras 800-804, in which 
the Tribunal distinguishes the position of customary fishing rights in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters on the one 
hand and in the exclusive economic zone on the other hand. 
35 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 8), 636-637 (MN 62.16(g)).  
36 Attard (note 17), 169. 
37 John W. Kindt, The Law of the Sea: Anadromous and Catadromous Fish Stocks, Sedentary Species, and the Highly 
0LJUDWRU\6SHFLHV6\UDFXVH-RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG&RPPHUFHµ%\SUHFOXGLQJIRUHLJQ
fishermen from catching the available surplus of U.S fish, this provision appears to violate the letter and spirit of article 62 
RIWKH/26&RQYHQWLRQ¶6HHWKHPRUHQXDQFHGFRPPHQWVRIWilliam T. Burke, U.S. Fishery Management and the New 
Law of the Sea, AJIL 76 (1982), 24, 39. 
38 Markowski (note 22), 67. 
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negotiations, it is common for the States concerned to conclude an access agreement. There are two 
principal types of such agreement.39 Firstly, agreements may provide a medium term framework for 
fisheries cooperation which set general principles but require specific decisions concerning access 
to be made on an annual basis, either by agreement between the parties or unilaterally by the coastal 
State. Alternatively, an access agreement may be a self-contained agreement which specifies the 
details of the access offered by the coastal State in the agreement itself, including the number of 
vessels authorized and the payment to be made.  
16 In the majority of caseVGHYHORSLQJ6WDWHV¶((=DUHDFFHVVHGE\GLVWDQW-water fishing fleets 
from developed countries, so questions have emerged as to the unequal bargaining power in the 
negotiations on access. In particular the General Assembly has called for access agreements with 
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVµRQHTXLWDEOHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHEDVLV¶ZLWKDYLHZWRDVVLVWLQJWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRI
the benefits from the development of fisheries resources in developing States.40  
17 As a major distant water fishing entity, the EU provides an important source of practice 
concerning the conclusion of access agreements. In the past, the EU has simply entered into 
agreements to pay coastal States in return for access to their fish stocks. The more recent practice of 
the EU reflects a more serious regard for the needs of developing countries to benefit from the 
arrangement and general cooperation agreements between the EU and developing countries 
increasingly seek to promote the sustainable utilization of fish stocks within the coastal State. For 
instance, in the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and its Member States, and 77 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, parties ± ZKLFKLQFOXGHµQHDUO\DOOGHYHORSLQJ6WDWHV¶ZLWK
which the EU concluded access agreements41 ± µH[SUHVVHGWKHLUZLOOLQJQHVV¶to negotiate fisheries 
DJUHHPHQWVDLPHGDWJXDUDQWHHLQJµVXVWDLQDEOH¶DQGPXWXDOO\VDWLVIDFWRU\FRQGLWLRQVIRUILVKLQJ
activities in ACP States.42 In its 2010 version, the Cotonou Agreement further provides that, with 
reference to marine resources within the EEZs of ACP States, cooperation aims at further 
developing these sectors in ACP countries to increase the associated social and economic benefits in 
a sustainable manner in light of the contribution of these sectors to employment creation, revenue 
generation, food security, livelihoods of rural and coastal communities and poverty reduction. The 
agreement identifies in detail the cooperation activities to be undertaken to this end, including: 
development and implementation of national and regional sustainable aquaculture and fisheries 
development strategies and management plans; mainstreaming of aquaculture and fisheries into 
national and regional development strategies; and the development of joint ventures for investment 
in the sector. Notably, the new provision anticipates a high-level consultation, including at 
ministerial meetings, upon joint agreement with a view to developing, improving or strengthening 
ACP-EU development cooperation in this sector. It also requires that any fisheries agreements that 
may be negotiated between the EU and ACP States pay due consideration to consistency with 
development strategies in this area. 
18 7XUQLQJWRWKH(8¶VSUDFWLFHFRQFHUQLQJILVKHULHVDFFHVVDJUHHPHQWVWKHPVHOYHVWKH(8
has attempted to shift from a so-called practice of µSD\ILVKDQGOHDYH¶ELODWHUDODFFHVVDJUHHPHQWV
WRDQHZJHQHUDWLRQRIµ)LVKHULHV3DUWQHUVKLSV$JUHHPHQWV¶ODXQFKHGLQWKDWDLPVWRSURYLGH
a legal basis through policy dialogue about sensitive sustainability issues with developing coastal 
                                                          
39 See Jean Carrox/Michel Savini, The Practice of Coastal States Regarding Foreign Access to Fishery Resources, in: 
FAO Fish Resources Report (note 1), Annex 2. 
40 GA Res. 61/105 of 6 March 2007, para. 100. 
41 Churchill/Owen (note 28), 345. 
42 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, 
and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, OJEU 2000, 
L 317/3 (Cotonou Agreement). See Art. 23 of its 2010 revision at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf. 
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States.43 These agreements thus aim to strengthen cooperation between the EU and third States in 
the promotion of sustainable fisheries in the third-State waters through the joint monitoring of the 
State of fisheries resources by a joint scientific committee and consultations on sustainable fisheries 
measures.44 According to these agreements, the EU financial contribution is to be divided between 
payment for access and support for fisheries management activities in the coastal State, with a 
defined percentage of payment to be devoted to the promotion of conservation of resources and 
sustainable development in the coastal State.45 These agreements, however, have been criticised for 
their limited attention to subsistence fisheries in coastal States.46 
19 Although it is not a party to the Convention, the practice of the United States concerning 
allocation of fisheries surplus also provides an interesting illustration of the manner in which this 
SRZHUFDQEHXVHG7KHUHOHYDQWGRPHVWLFOHJLVODWLRQH[SOLFLWO\SURYLGHVWKDWµDllocations of [the 
WRWDODOORZDEOHOHYHORIIRUHLJQILVKLQJ@DUHGLVFUHWLRQDU\¶47 DQGµWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH>«@
GHWHUPLQHVWKHDOORFDWLRQDPRQJIRUHLJQQDWLRQVRIILVKVSHFLHVDQGVSHFLHVJURXSV¶48 National laws 
dictate a number of considerations to be taken into account when determining access to fish stocks 
in United States waters, which not only include issues mentioned in the Convention, such as 
µwhether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nation have traditionally engaged in fishing 
in suFKILVKHU\¶49 and µwhether, and to what extent, such nation requires the fish harvested from the 
H[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQHIRULWVGRPHVWLFFRQVXPSWLRQ¶50, but also issues related to trade51 and 
cooperation in the enforcement of fisheries regulations.52 Indeed, the so-called Packwood 
Amendment requires the Secretary of State to reduce access to US fish stocks by 50% if a foreign 
fishing vessel is flagged in a country which is certified as µconducting fishing operations or 
engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of the International Convention for 
WKH5HJXODWLRQRI:KDOLQJ¶53 The threat of certification and withdrawal of access to fisheries 
resources was used by the United States in the 1980s as a means to persuade Japan to withdraw its 
reservations to the moratorium on commercial whaling.54 This power was subsequently exercised 
when Japan commenced its scientific whaling programme in 1987, but as noted by one 
commentator, µWKHDFWLRQZDVOHVVVLJQLILFDQWDVLWDSSHDUHG>DV@WKH86ILVKHU\-management 
councils already had concluded that the fish stocks in the U.S. fishery-conservation zone were too 
ORZ>DQG@-DSDQKDGFRQVHTXHQWO\QRWEHHQDOORFDWHGDTXRWDIRU¶55 Nevertheless, this 
example illustrates the exercise of fisheries quotas as a tool to promote a range of policy objectives, 
which would seem to be compatible with the provisions of the Convention. 
20 The United States has also used fisheries access agreements to the benefit of its distant-
water fishing fleet. The most important of these agreements is the Treaty on Fisheries between the 
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of 
                                                          
43 See generally, Churchill/Owen (note 28); reference to Fisheries Partnership Agreements can be found in the Art. 53 (1) 
Cotonou Agreement. 
44 Churchill/Owen (note 28), 346-348. 
45 Ibid., 348. 
46 John Vogler/Charlotte Bretherton, The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor: the Case of External 
Fisheries Policy, Journal of European Integration 30 (2008), 401. 
47 §600.516(a) Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (US). 
48 §600.517 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (US). 
49 16 US Code §1824(e)(1)(E)(vi). 
50 16 US Code §1824(e)(1)(E)(iv). 
51 16 US Code §1824(e)(1)(E)(i) and (ii). 
52 16 US Code §1824(e)(1)(E)(iii). 
53 16 US Code §1824(e)(2). 
54 See Sean D. Murphy, United States Practice in International Law, vol. 1 (2011), 171-172. 
55 Ibid., 172. 
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America.56 The treaty applies to the waters of several States in the Pacific, including Australia, the 
Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and 
Western Samoa. Under the agreement, US fishing vessels are permitted to engage in fishing in the 
waters of the Pacific Island parties in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in 
annexes to the treaty57ZKHUHDVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDJUHHVWRµFRRSHUDWHZLWKWKH3DFLILF,VODQG
parties through the provision of technical and economic support to assist the Pacific Island parties to 
DFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHRIPD[LPL]LQJEHQHILWVIURPWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHLUILVKHULHVUHVRXUFHV¶58 
The economic benefits include a lump-sum access fee59 and the treaty also specifies that US vessels 
should use, as appropriate, the canning, transshipment, slipping and repair facilities located in the 
Pacific Island parties, purchase as appropriate equipment and supplies form these parties, and 
employ as appropriate nationals from the parties on board US fishing vessels.60 The treaty first 
entered into force in 1988 and its application was provisionally extended on a number of occasions. 
A revised version of the treaty was agreed in principle in June 2016, although it is subject to further 
review before it can be opened for signature.61  
21 China, Korea and Japan are also all significant distant-water fishing nations but information 
concerning their practice is more difficult to come by as access agreements are not necessarily 
published. Generally speaking, oQHVRXUFHVXJJHVWVWKDWµPRVWRIWKLVDFFHVVLVEDVHGRQWKH
payment of license fees by individual vessels to coastal countries, rather than a broad country-to-
FRXQWU\DJUHHPHQW¶62  
22 Like other discretionary decisions of the coastal State relating to EEZ fisheries, decisions 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHDOORFDWLRQRIWKHVXUSOXVDUHQRWVXEMHFWWRELQGLQJGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWĺ$UW
(3)(a)). 
µ1DWLRQDOVRIRWKHU6WDWHV>«@VKDOOFRPSO\ZLWK>«@ODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV¶ 
23 When a coastal State does allocate fishing rights to other States in the EEZ, the Convention 
leaves no doubt that the coastal State maintains the right to regulate the foreign vessels fishing in its 
waters. In particular, Art. 62 (4) makes clear that nationals of other States must comply with the 
coQVHUYDWLRQPHDVXUHVDGRSWHGE\WKHFRDVWDO6WDWHXQGHU$UWDQGZLWKµWKHRWKHUWHUPVDQG
FRQGLWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWKHODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQVRIWKHFRDVWDO6WDWH¶7KHSDUDJUDSKJRHVRQWROLVW
a series of subjects which may be regulated by the coastal State, including licensing, quotas, and 
other specific regulations relating to fishing vessels and fishing gear. 
24 7KHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHWHUPµinter alia¶PDNHVFOHDUWKDWWKLVOLVWLVLOOXVWUDWLYHDQGFRDVWDO
States may adopt other forms of law and regulations, provided they are consistent with the 
Convention. At the same time, the coastal States powers are not unlimited. As noted by the arbitral 
tribunal in the Dispute Concerning Filleting in the Gulf of St LawrenceµDOWKRXJKWKHOLVWLVQRW
exhaustive, it does not appear that the regulatory authority of the coastal State normally includes the 
                                                          
56 Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States 
of America, 2 April 1987, UNTS 2176, 93. 
57 Art. 3 (1) Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America. 
58 Art. 2 (1) Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America. 
59 Stephen Mbithi Mwikya, Fisheries Access Agreements: Trade and Development Issues (2006), 7. 
60 Art. 2 (2) Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America. 
61.See Press Release from the US Department of State, 29 June 2016, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/259201.htm  
62 Mwikya (note 59), 8. For further information, see supra, MN 9. 
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DXWKRULW\WRUHJXODWHVXEMHFWVRIDGLIIHUHQWQDWXUHWKDQWKRVHGHVFULEHG¶63 In that case, there was a 
dispute concerning whether Canada could regulate the filleting of fish by French freezer trawlers in 
WKH*XOIRI6W/DZUHQFH7KHWULEXQDOLQGLFDWHGWKDWLQLWVRSLQLRQµWKHUHJXODWLRQRIILOOHWLQJDWVHD
FDQQRWDSULRULEHMXVWLILHGE\FRDVWDO6WDWHSRZHUVXQGHUWKH>81&/26@¶64 This interpretation of 
the Convention has been criticized as being too restrictive by many commentators65 and it arguably 
gives too little weight to the fact that the Convention permits a broad range of coastal State 
regulations including some regulations that do not relate directly to fishing activity itself, such as 
UHTXLULQJWKDWDOORUSDUWRIWKHFDWFKLVODQGHGLQWKHSRUWVRIWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHĺ$UWK
Nevertheless, the point that coastal State powers in the EEZ are not unlimited is undoubtedly 
FRUUHFWĺ$UW,QGHHGPRre recent tribunals appear to have adopted a broader understanding 
of the right to regulate living resources in the EEZ. Drawing upon relevant State practice and 
international treaties, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) confirmed in The 
09µ9LUJLQLD *¶&DVHthat the power to regulate fishing under Part V of the Convention extends to 
the regulation of bunkering of fishing vessels.66 
25 The precise terms and conditions attached to access will depend on the arrangements 
between the coastal State and the State requesting access. In some cases, such terms and conditions 
are negotiated between the two parties, whereas in other cases the terms and conditions are set 
unilaterally by the coastal State.67 In the latter case, it may be against the requirement of good faith 
ĺ$UWLIWKHFRDVWDO6WDWH¶VUHJXODWLRQVLQHIIHFWSUHFOXGHRWKHU6WDWHVIURPWDNLQJWKHVXUSOXV
allocation. In other words, these requirements are expected to be reasonable and relate to legitimate 
conservation and management goals, taking into account alternative measures.68 
26 $UWDPDNHVDSDUWLFXODUUHIHUHQFHWRµWKHSD\PHQWRIIHHVDQGRWKHUIRUPVRI
UHPXQHUDWLRQ¶ZKLFKPDNHVLWFOHDUWKDWDFRDVWDO6WDWHFDQGHPDQGFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHULJKWWR
fish in iWV((=:KLOVWWKH&RQYHQWLRQPHQWLRQVµFRPSHQVDWLRQLQWKHILHOGRIILQDQFLQJHTXLSPHQW
DQGWHFKQRORJ\UHODWLQJWRWKHILVKLQJLQGXVWU\¶ĺ$UWDLWLVFRPPRQSUDFWLFHIRU6WDWHV
to accept other forms of compensation that are not at all related to fishing.69 
27 A major problem has arisen with the enforcement of laws and regulations against foreign 
fishing vessels. Generally, a foreign fishing vessel which has been allowed access to resources 
within the EEZ is subject to the full authority of the coastal State, subject to some limitations set out 
                                                          
63 Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence (note 15), para. 52. See also Carl A. Fleischer, The 
Exclusive Economic Zone under the Convention Regime and in State Practice, in: Albert W. Koers/Bernard H. Oxman 
(eds.), The 1982 ConvHQWLRQRQWKH/DZRIWKH6HDµLWVHHPVUHDVRQDEOHWRFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHUHJXODWRU\
powers of a coastal [S]tate cannot be unlimited. For example, it may not freely issue and enforce rules on the construction 
and equipment of foreign vessels that would make it impossible in practice to enjoy fishing rights existing under 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶1HYHUWKHOHVV)OHLVFKHUFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULW\RIWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHLVµLQWHQGHGWREH
UDWKHUEURDG¶ibid., 276. 
64 Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence (note 15), para. 52. 
65 ,QGHHGWKHGLVVHQWLQJDUELWUDWRULQWKHFDVHIRXQGWKDWµ>W@KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKDWLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\DJUHHPHQWRU
arrangement to the contrary, the coastal State may regulate processing, incOXGLQJILOOHWLQJ¶Dispute Concerning Filleting 
within the Gulf of St Lawrence (note 15), Dissenting Opinion of Donat Pharand, para. 17. See also Ted L. McDorman, 
French Fishing Rights in Canadian Waters: The 1986 La Bretagne Arbitration, International Journal of Estuarine and 
Coastal Law 4 (1989) 52, 58-59; William T. Burke, Coastal State Fishery Regulation under International Law: A 
Comment on the La Bretagne Award of July 17, 1986, San DiegoLRev 25 (1988), 495, 502-503. 
66 ITLOS, 7KH09µ9LUJLQLD*¶&DVH (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau), Judgment of 14 April 2014, para. 217, available at: 
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=171. 
67 See FAO Fish Resources Report (note 1), para. 11. 
68 Markowski (note 22), 142-146. 
69 See e.g. Attard (note 17), 173-174. He gives the interesting example of the 1974 Mauritania/Greece Fisheries 
Agreement under which Greek vessels had to pay a fee based on tonnage and the Greek government also agreed to build a 
hotel. See also Gerald Moore, National Legislation for the Management of Fisheries under Extended Coastal State 
Jurisdiction, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 11 (1980), 153. 
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in Art. 73.70 ,QGHHGµLQOLJKWRIWKHVSHFLDOULJKWVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVJLYHQWRWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHLQ
the [EEZ] under the Convention, the primary responsibility for taking the necessary measures to 
prevent, deter and eliminate [illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)] fishing rests with the 
FRDVWDO6WDWH¶71 In practice, however, many developing coastal States do not have the financial or 
technical resources to effectively enforce their law and regulations and IUU fishing by foreign 
vessels is a significant issue.72 In this regard, tKH(8¶VILVKHULHVDFFHVVDJUHHPHQWVhave been 
FULWLFLVHGIRUWKHIDLOXUHRI(8YHVVHOVWRREVHUYHWKLUG6WDWHV¶ILVKHULHVOHJLVODWLRQDQGDSSOLFDEOH
EU law.73 While EU law on fisheries conservation applies to EU vessels fishing in third-State 
waters, including with regard to driftnets, shark finning and encircling of marine mammals with 
SXUVHVHLQHQHWVLWKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWLQFDVHRIDFRQIOLFWZLWKWKHWKLUG6WDWH¶VODZVWhe latter 
would prevail.74 The vessels of other distant fishing nations have also been criticized for IUU 
fishing.75 The Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States expressly addresses this issue by specifically for continuing flag 
6WDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\$UWRIWKDWWUHDW\SURYLGHVWKDWµWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKDOO
take the necessary steps to ensure that nationals and fishing vessels of the United States refrain from 
fishing in the Licensing Area and in waters closed to fishing pursuant to Annex I, except as 
DXWKRUL]HGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK$UWLFOH¶LQFOXGLQJWDNLQJUHDVRQDEOHPHDVXUHVWRDVVLVWWKH3DFLILF
Island parties in investigations of any alleged breach of the treaty or bringing proceedings itself 
against the delinquent vessel.  
28 The ITLOS recently confirmed that flag States retain some responsibility under the 
Convention for ensuring compliance by their vessels with the laws and regulations adopted by the 
coastal State. In its SRFC Advisory Opinion, delivered on 2 April 2015, the Tribunal held that 
µDUWLFOHSDUDJUDSKRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQLPSRVHVDQREOLJDWLRQRQ6WDWHVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHLUQDWLRQDOV
engaged in fishing activities within the exclusive economic zone of a coastal State comply with the 
FRQVHUYDWLRQPHDVXUHVDQGZLWKWKHRWKHUWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGLQLWVODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV¶76  
7KH\FODULILHGWKDWWKLVLVDGXHGLOLJHQFHREOLJDWLRQZKLFKUHTXLUHVWKHIODJ6WDWHWRµWDNHDOO
necessary measures to ensure compliance and to prevent IUU fishing by fishing vessels flying its 
IODJ¶77 The Tribunal identified a number of necessary measures, including ensuring that its vessels 
are properly marked, adopting legislation prohibiting its vessels from fishing in the EEZ of another 
state without authorization, and developing enforcement mechanisms to monitor and secure 
FRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHVHODZVLQFOXGLQJVDQFWLRQVWKDWDUHµVXIILFLHQWWRGHWHUYLRODWLRQVDQGWR
deprive offenders of the benefits accruiQJIURPWKHLU,88ILVKLQJDFWLYLWLHV¶78 The explicit 
identification of this duty may go some way to addressing deficiencies in enforcement by the 
coastal State, but it is also necessary to work out precisely how the responsibilities of flag State 
interface with the responsibilities of the coastal State in this context. 
                                                          
70 For further information, see Harrison on Art. 73. 
71 ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory 
Opinion of 2 April 2015, para. 106, available at: https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-21/. 
72 See European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, The Role of China in World Fisheries (2012), 72-73. 
73 Churchill/Owen (note 28), 348-349. 
74 Ibid., 332-333. 
75 See e.g. The Role of China in World Fisheries (note 72), 72-73. 
76 SRFC Advisory Opinion (note 71), para. 123. 
77 Ibid., para. 129. 
78 Ibid., para. 138. See also The South China Sea Arbitration (note 34), paras 740-744, supporting the existence of a due 
diligence obligation on flag states to control the activities of vessels flying their flag when fishing in the exclusive 
economic zone of another state. A closer reading reveals the Tribunal adopts a slightly different interpretation of Art. 
ZKLFKLWILQGVµLPSRVHVDQREOLJDWLRQGLUHFWO\RQSULYDWHSDUWLHVHQJDJHGLQILVKLQJ«¶SDUD 
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29 $UWUHTXLUHVWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHWRJLYHµGXHQRWLFH¶RIFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQW
laws and regulations. It does not specify what form this due notice must take and it may presumably 
be satisfied by the publication of laws and regulations.79 
                                                          
79 7KHWHUPµGXHQRWLFH¶LVIUHTXHQWO\XVHGZLWKLQWKH&RQYHQWLRQVHHHJĺ$UWV, 147 (2)(a). 
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Article 63 
Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States or both 
within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it 
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic 
zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to 
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice to 
the other provisions of this Part. 
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive 
economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the 
States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for 
the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area. 
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µVWRFNV>«@RFFXU>LQJ@ERWKZLWKLQWKHH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQHDQGLQDQDUHDEH\RQG 
DQGDGMDFHQWWRWKH]RQH¶ 7 
µDVVRFLDWHGVSHFLHV¶ 13 
µ6WDWHVVKDOOVHHNHLWKHUGLUHFWO\RUWKURXJKDSSURSULDWH>«@RUJDQL]DWLRQVWo agree upon  
WKHPHDVXUHVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶ 14 
I. Purpose and Function 
1 Art. 63 singles out two groups of resources that do not occur exclusively within the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a single coastal State, namely transboundary stocks ± that is 
stocks that occur within the EEZ of two or more coastal States and straddling stocks, i.e. stocks that 
occur both within the EEZ of the coastal State and in the adjacent high seas.1 For these stocks, 
arrangements additional to the coastal State¶VPHDVXUHVĺ$UWDUHUHTXLUHGWRHQVXUHHIIHFWLYH
conservation and management.2 Art. 63 sets out specific requirements concerning transboundary 
cooperation between coastal States, in relation to transboundary stocks, and between coastal and 
other States fishing straddling stocks in adjacent high seas. These obligations also apply to 
DVVRFLDWHGVSHFLHV7KHVHREOLJDWLRQVDUHFRQVLGHUHGµSDUWDWOHDVWRIWKHJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLIQRWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFXVWRP¶3 
2 Both provisions contained in Art. 63 create an obligation to enter into negotiations (pacta 
de negotiando) rather than an obligation to reach an agreement (pacta de contrahendo); thus they 
UHTXLUHFRDVWDO6WDWHVWRµHQWHULQWRQHJRWLDWLRQVLQJRRGIDLWKUHVSRQGWRJHQXLQHattempts at 
QHJRWLDWLRQVDQGWREHSUHSDUHGWRPRGLI\WKHLURULJLQDOSRVLWLRQV¶4 The International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), classifying these as due diligence obligations, has also held that:  
µWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQVVKRXOGEHPHDQLQJIXOLQthe sense that substantial effort should be made by all States 
concerned, with a view to adopting effective measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation 
DQGGHYHORSPHQWRIVKDUHGVWRFNV¶5 
Failure to comply could lead to international responsibility and it has been noted that:  
µDQ\GLVSXWHDULVLQJIURPWKHDOOHJHGIDLOXUHWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKHREOLJDWLRQXQGHUDUWLFOHSDUDJUDSKRI
the Convention, unlike those disputes arising from the exercise of sovereign rights of the coastal State with 
respect to the living resources in its EEZ, can be submitted to the compulsory procedure under Part XV, 
VHFWLRQRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶6 
II. Historical Background 
3 The problem of straddling fish stocks had already been recognized at UNCLOS I, and it 
received an innovative solution in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas (High Seas Fishing Convention). The High Seas Fishing 
                                                          
1 Note that the Convention does not use these terms. However, see David H. Anderson, Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, MPEPIL, para. 2, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. For a discussion of the difference between biological 
and legal concepts of stocks, as well as the inconsistent use of the term stock (as opposed to species) in the Convention 
and other relevant international agreements, see Kaare Bangert, Fish Stocks, MPEPIL, paras. 1-6, available at: 
http://www.mpepil.com. 
2 Myron H. Nordquist/Satya N. Nandan/Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: 
A Commentary, vol. II (1993), 641. 
3 Marion Markowski, The International Law of EEZ Fisheries (2010), 55. 
4 Ellen Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources (1989), 116-118 and 158-159; 
Markowski (note 3), 51; Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 2), 646. See also ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion 
Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015, para. 210 where the 
7ULEXQDOVD\VWKDWWKLVSURYLVLRQUHTXLUHVµWKH6WDWHVFRQFHUQHGWRFRQVXOWZLWKRQHDQRWKHULQJRRGIDLWKSXUVXDQWWR
DUWLFOHRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶DYDLODEOHDWKWWSVZZZLWORVRUJHQFDVHVOLVW-of-cases/case-no-21/ For further 
information on the concept of good faith, see 2¶%ULHQ on Art. 300. 
5 SRFC Advisory Opinion (note 4), para. 210. 
6 SRFC Advisory Opinion (note 4), Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, para. 38. 
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Convention recognized that FRDVWDO6WDWHVKDGDµVSHFLDOLQWHUHVW¶LQWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIILVKVWRFNV
in waters adjacent to their territorial sea7, and it provided that 
µDQ\FRDVWDO6WDWHPD\ZLWKDYLHZWRWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHSURGXFWLYLW\RIWKHOLYLQJUHVRXUFHVRIWKHVHD
adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish or other marine resources in any 
area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, provided that negotiations to that effect with the other 
States concerned have not led to an agreHPHQWZLWKLQVL[PRQWKV¶8  
Such unilateral measures were under the conditions laid down in Art. 7 (2) High Seas Fishing 
Convention binding on other member States. At the same time, the High Seas Fishing Convention 
established a special procedure whereby other States could challenge any unilateral measures 
adopted by a coastal State through a special commission.9 These provisions aimed to ensure an 
effective regime for the conservation of fish stocks in coastal waters and compatibility between 
measures taken by the coastal State and other fishing States. They were, however, highly 
controversial and the High Seas Fishing Convention received the lowest rate of acceptance amongst 
the instruments adopted at UNCLOS I.10 
4 Even though States had agreed to extend the fisheries jurisdiction of coastal States at 
UNCLOS III,11 the question of compatibility between conservation measures taken by coastal States 
and other fishing States still arose in the negotiations concerning the EEZ. At the 1972 session of 
the Sea-Bed Committee, a working paper was submitted by Canada suggesting that an appropriate 
PDQDJHPHQWPHFKDQLVPIRUµZLGH-UDQJLQJVSHFLHV¶FRXOGEHDQµLQWHUQDWLRQDODXWKRULW\¶12 The 
drafters then considered alternative approaches such as favoring close consultation between 
international institutions and coastal States or simply cooperation.13 A proposal to allow invoking 
the dispute settlement mechanism of the Convention to determine measures to be applied in 
adjacent areas for the conservation of straddling stocks where no agreement on such measures could 
be reached by parties concerned was eventually withdrawn at the eleventh session of UNCLOS III14 
and States settled on a provision which simply required cooperation between relevant States. The 
result is, however, framed in vague and essentially hortatory language, and it has been characterized 
DVSDUWRIWKHµXQILQLVKHGDJHQGD¶RIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ15 Indeed, UNCLOS has been supplemented by 
other instruments on this topic, notably the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA). 
III. Elements 
µVWRFNV>«@RFFXU>LQJ@ZLWKLQWKHH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQHRIWZRRUPRUHFRDVWDO6WDWHV¶ 
5 $UWFUHDWHVDQREOLJDWLRQIRUWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHWRµVHHNWRDJUHH¶ZLWKRWKHUFRQFHUQHG
coastal States upon necessary measures for the management of transboundary stocks. This entails 
that States must seek to adopt jointly or coordinate their conservation measures, jointly determine a 
WRWDODOORZDEOHFDWFKĺ Art. 61) for these stocks and allocate the total allowable amongst 
themselves. In the absence of agreement, however, coastal States would seem to be able to set their 
own allowable catch in accordance with Art. 61. In light of Art. 300, States should do so in good 
faith and should exercise their rights in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. Yet, 
there is a danger that such unilateral action will nevertheless undermine the long-term sustainability 
                                                          
7 Art. 6 (1) High Seas Fishing Convention. 
8 Art. 7 (1) High Seas Fishing Convention. 
9 Arts. 7 (4) and 9 High Seas Fishing Convention. 
10 See Robin R. Churchill/Alan V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn. 1999), 479-480 (Appendix 2, Table B).  
11 For further information, see Proelss on Art. 56 MN XX. 
12 Sea-Bed Committee, Management of the Living Resources of the Sea: Working Paper Submitted by the Delegation of 
Canada, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II./L.8 (1972), 3 (para. d). 
13 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 2), 641-645. 
14 L. Dolliver M. Nelson, Exclusive Economic Zone, MPEPIL, para. 55, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. 
15 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The High Seas Fisheries Regime: At a Point of No Return?, IJMCL 8 (1993), 327; see also 
David Freestone, Implementing Precaution Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Ellen Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (1999), 287, 291. 
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of a stock if the disagreement between the coastal States continues. The dispute between Iceland 
and Faroe Islands and the EU on the joint management of the stock of North East Atlantic 
mackerel16 provides a useful example: lack of agreement among coastal States is compounded by 
the setting of autonomous catch limits at very high levels that arguably posed a threat to the 
sustainability of the stock. As mackerel fisheries by Iceland and the Faroe islands are mostly carried 
out in their EEZs, they are not subject to the competence of the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission, the regional fisheries management organization in charge of management of mackerel 
in international waters of the North-east Atlantic, and mackerel would not meet the criteria for 
listing under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora. The EU has been considering various options to persuade Iceland and Faroe Islands to 
cooperate.17 Following the adoption of trade sanctions by the EU, legal proceedings were initiated 
by the Faroe Islands under both the WTO Agreement and the Convention, but the litigation was 
subsequently terminated following a settlement by the parties.18 
6 Within its own portion of total allowable catch, each State may regulate access to the 
fisheries for both nationals and third State vessels individually.19 Thus, coastal States retain their 
rights under Arts. 56, 61 and 62.20 7KHUHIHUHQFHWRµGHYHORSPHQW¶RIWKHVHVWRFNVHPSKDVL]HVWKH
possibility of exploiting little-used stocks more effectively and, read in conjunction with the 
requirements in Art. 61, points to the need for a long-term strategy of maintaining transboundary 
stocks as a viable resource.21 ,QGHHG,7/26KDVVWUHVVHGWKDWWKHWHUPµGHYHORSPHQW¶DVXVHGLQ
$UWPXVWEHXQGHUVWRRGWRPHDQWKDWµWKHVHVWRFNs should be used as fishery resources within the 
IUDPHZRUNRIDVXVWDLQDEOHILVKHULHVPDQDJHPHQWUHJLPH¶QRWLQJWKDWWKLVPD\LQFOXGH
PRUH
effective fisheries management schemes to ensure the long-term sustainability of exploited stocks' 
but also stock restoration. 22 
µVWRFNV>«@RFFXU>LQJ@ERWKZLWKLQWKHH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF]RQHDQGLQDQDUHDEH\RQGDQG
DGMDFHQWWRWKH]RQH¶ 
7 Art. 63 (2) creates a similar obligation to that in Art. 63 (1) for concerned coastal States and 
States fishing for straddling stocks in the adjacent high seas. The term straddling stocks is not used 
in Art. 63 (2), but it is a term that was first employed in Agenda 21 in its call for the negotiation of 
an implementing agreement23 and it is used in the UNFSA, albeit without being concretely 
                                                          
16 For details of this dispute stretching back to 2010, see 
http://www.scottishpelagic.co.uk/news_views/mackerel_dispute.htm 
17 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Certain Measures Directed to Non-Collaborating Countries for the Purpose of the Conservation of 
Fish Stocks, SEC(2011) 1576 final (2011). See also Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 793/2013 of 20 
August 2013, OJ 2013 L 223, 1, establishing measures in respect of the Faroe Islands to ensure the conservation of the 
Atlanto-Scandian herring stock. 
18 See WTO, European Union ± Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, Joint Communication from Denmark in respect 
of the Faroe Islands and the European Union of 21 August 2014, WT/DS469/3; PCA (Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under 
Annex VII UNCLOS), Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration (The Kingdom of Denmark in Respect of the Faroe 
Islands/European Union), Termination Order of 23 September 2014, available at: http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/25. 
19 Hey (note 4), 55-56, 68 and 91; Markowski (note 3), 50-51; L. Dolliver M. Nelson, The Development of the Legal 
Regime of High Seas Fisheries, in: Alan Boyle/David Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development 
(1999), 121. 
20 David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (1987), 183. 
21 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 2), 647. SRFC Advisory Opinion (note 4), para. 198. 
22 SRFC Advisory Opinion (note 4), para. 198. 
23 UNCED, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, UN Doc. 
A.CONF/151/26/REV.1 (Vol. I) (1992), 9 (Agenda 21), Ch. 17.45, 17.49. 
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defined.24 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) includes mackerel, squids and pollock 
among straddling stocks.25 
8 8QGHU$UW6WDWHVPXVWµVHHNWRDJUHH¶RQFRQVHUYDWLRQPHDVXUHV7KHUHVXOWLVWKDW
µWKHFRDVWDO6WDWHKDVDVD\RYHU conservation in the area of the high seas adjacent to its EEZ, even if 
LWGRHVQRWILVKWKHUHDQGWKDWILVKLQJ6WDWHV¶IUHHGRPRIILVKLQJLQWKDWDUHDLVVXEMHFWWRWKHULJKWV
and interests of the coastal State, as is expressly confirmed in Art. 116 (b).¶26 This is justified by the 
fact that unrestrained fishing of straddling stocks in the high seas would render useless any measure 
adopted in the EEZ and vice versa.27  Two elements, however, differentiate Art. 63 (2) from Art. 63 
(1). First of all, the agreement on necessary measures only concerns the area beyond the EEZ, as no 
cooperative arrangement is expressly required for the whole range of the stocks.28 Thus, the 
discretion of coastal States to adopt conservation and management measures within their own EEZ 
is not affected by this article. Second, the international obligation related to straddling stocks has 
been elaborated in the UNFSA.29 Thus, for State parties to UNCLOS that are also parties to the 
UNFSA,30 the obligation enshrined in Art. 63 (2) is complemented by the more specific 
requirements found in the UNFSA. Most of the provisions of the UNFSA are directed at fishing on 
the high seas for straddling (and highly migratory) stocks. However, several provisions are made 
specifically applicable to the EEZ, namely its general principles (Art. 5 UNFSA), the precautionary 
approach (Art. 6 UNFSA) and compatibility provisions (Art. 7 UNFSA).31 7KLVUHVXOWVLQµSODFLQJ
obligations on coastal States with regard to the conservation and management of such stocks within 
WKHLU((=V¶32 ,WKDVWKXVEHHQREVHUYHGWKDWµZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIVWUDGGOLQJVWRFNV
within national jurisdiction, the [Fish Stocks] Agreement heightens the degree of obligation on the 
FRDVWDOVWDWHLPSRVHGE\$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶33  
9 The UNFSA expands upon the concepts used in UNCLOS by including more contemporary 
notions related to long-term sustainability of fish stocks, the protection of species within the same 
ecosystem; the prevention and elimination of overfishing and excess fishing capacity; minimizing 
pollution and discard; protection of marine biodiversity, and impact assessment.34 In addition, Art. 7 
UNFSA requires compatible management of fisheries within and beyond national jurisdiction, 
WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHVµDGRSWHGDQGDSSOLHG¶E\WKH
coastal State and it requires States to ensure that measures established for the high seas do not 
undermine the effectiveness of such measures. On the other hand, States are to take into account 
previously agreed measures for relevant high seas areas, biological characteristics of the stocks and 
the relationships between the distribution of stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities 
of the region concerned, but also respective dependence on the stocks of concerned coastal and 
fishing States.35 7KLVSURYLVLRQKDVEHHQLQWHUSUHWHGDVµUHTXLULQJWKHFRDVWDO>6@WDWHWRSURYLGH
leadership in fisheries management by actually applying Article 61 principles within the EEZ 
                                                          
24 Bangert (note 1), para. 6. 
25 Jean-Jacques Maguire et al., The State of World Highly Migratory, Straddling and Other High Seas Fishery Resources 
and Associated Species: FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 495 (2006). Cf. also Owen on Annex I. 
26 Anderson (note 1), para. 6. 
27 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 2), 647. 
28 Attard (note 20), 184. 
29 Art. 7 (1)(a) UNFSA replicates Art. 63 (2) UNCLOS. 
30 At the time of writing the UNFSA counts 78 parties, with 2 parties (Iran and the US) not being party to UNCLOS, cf. 
the  table elaborated by the UN DOALOS, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf.  
31 Art. 3 UNFSA. 
32 Markowski (note 3), 17. 
33 Donna R. Christie, The Conservation and Management of Stocks Located Solely within the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
in: Hey (note 14), 395, 413. 
34 Ibid., 414. 
35 Art. 7 (2) UNFSA; see also Moritaka Hayashi, The Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Hey 
(note 15), 51, 61-62. 
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EHIRUHREOLJDWLRQVIRUFRPSDWLEOHH[SORLWDWLRQFDQEHLPSRVHGRQKLJKVHDVILVKHULHV¶36 The 
obligations are coupled with the duty to inform other concerned States about the measures adopted 
for stocks concerned and to make every effort to reach a provisional arrangement pending the 
agreement on compatible measures.37 The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,38 as a 
non legally-binding instrument that offers principles and standards applicable to the conservation, 
management and development of all fisheries including within the EEZ, thus providing a 
framework for national and international efforts39 in the implementation of Art. 63 of the 
Convention, calls for compatibility of conservation and management measures for transboundary 
and straddling fish stocks to be achieved in a manner consistent with the rights, competences and 
interests of the States concerned.40  
10 Besides applying directly to its parties, it can also be argued that the UNFSA can be used as 
a subsequent agreement to inform the interpretation of UNCLOS in accordance with Art. 31 (3) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.41 However, the ability to use the UNFSA as an 
interpretative agreement depends on there being particular words in UNCLOS that require 
interpretation; it would not allow new obligations to be imposed on States Parties without some 
connection to the original wording of the Convention.42 In addition, it would be necessary for 
UNCLOS parties to agree WKDWWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQFRORXUHGE\WKH81)6$ZRXOGQRWµSUHMXGLFH¶
their rights, jurisdiction and duties under the Convention, as required by Art. 4 UNFSA. It is also 
possible that certain obligations in the UNFSA have become customary international law and are 
therefore binding on States Parties to UNCLOS in that way, whether or not they are a party to the 
UNFSA itself. This argument may apply to the general obligations to pursue an ecosystem approach 
and a precautionary approach.43 Indeed, many of the general principles found in the UNFSA are 
today reflected in other international fisheries instruments which suggests that they have received a 
degree of acceptance amongst the international community.44 At the same time, some rules in the 
UNFSA are clearly intended to apply only to the parties. This is true of the provisions on 
enforcement and dispute settlement in Arts. 21 and 27-32 UNFSA respectively which are expressed 
DVREOLJDWLRQVIRUWKHµ6WDWHV3DUWLHV¶DQGWKH\DUHWKHUHIRUHOHVVOLNHO\WRKDYHLQIOXHnced customary 
international law. 
µDVVRFLDWHGVSHFLHV¶ 
13 $UWDOVRPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRVWRFNVWKDWDUHµDVVRFLDWHG¶45 with transboundary or 
straddling stocks. The expression is broad and does not clarify the intensity of the link or causal 
relation between target species and associated species, or whether the relationship is to be 
determined exclusively on the basis of biological criteria, or also economic and legal ones.46 Given 
that the expression is also used in the UNFSA, it has been argued that it should be interpreted in 
light of the precautionary approach and the international obligation to conserve biodiversity, with a 
                                                          
36 Christie (note 33), 414. 
37 Arts. 7 (5) and 7 (7)-(8) UNFSA; Hayashi (note 35), 61-62. 
38 FAO, Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries (1995). 
39 Preamble FAO Code of Conduct. 
40 Art. 7.3.2 FAO Code of Conduct. 
41 Freestone (note 15), 313. 
42 Tore Henriksen, Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal Obligations of States not Party to Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations, ODIL 40 (2009), 80, 81; James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (2011), 108. 
43 For further information on the ecosystem and the precautionary approach within UNCLOS, cf. Harrision/Morgera on 
Art. 61 and Czybulka on Art. 194. 
44 See further Harrison (note 42), 108-113. See also Erik Franckx, Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 8 (2000), 49-81. 
45 In similar contexts this term can also be found in Arts. 61 (4) and Art. 119 (1)(b).  
46 Bangert (note 1), para. 7. 
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view to underlining the need for integrated management based on an ecosystem approach.47 This is 
certainly the correct interpretation in light of the obligations arising from the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and international standards on the ecosystem approach. 
µ6WDWHVVKDOOVHHNHLWKHUGLUHFWO\RUWKURXJKDSSURSULDWH>«@RUJDQL]DWions, to agree upon 
WKHPHDVXUHVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶ 
14 Two options are envisaged to ensure cooperation in relation to transboundary and straddling 
stocks: States can cooperate directly among themselves, or they can do so through subregional or 
regional organizations.48 While the Convention does not express a preference for either form of 
cooperation, the FAO Code of Conduct encourages States concerned in the case of straddling stocks 
WRFRRSHUDWHµZKHUHDSSURSULDWHWKURXJKWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIa bilateral, subregional or regional 
ILVKHULHVRUJDQL]DWLRQRUDUUDQJHPHQW¶49 Moreover, the UNFSA provides that  
µ>Z@KHUHDVXEUHJLRQDORUUHJLRQDOILVKHULHVPDQDJHPHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQRUDUUDQJHPHQWKDVWKHFRPSHWHQFHWR
establish conservation and management measures for particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish 
stocks, States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty 
to cooperate by becoming members of such organization or participants in such arrangement, or by agreeing 
WRDSSO\WKHFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHVHVWDEOLVKHGE\VXFKRUJDQL]DWLRQRUDUUDQJHPHQW¶50  
In addition, the UNFSA encourages States to establish regional fisheries management organizations 
or arrangements where they do not already exist.51 Overall, relevant international instruments fall 
short of creating an obligation to establish regional fisheries bodies for straddling stocks,52 although 
in practice they have led to the modification of pre-existing regional arrangements and the creation 
of new ones.53 
15 UNCLOS provides no information on the specific goals of cooperation. However, this is 
another area in which the UNFSA fills in gaps by identifying the issues which should be regulated 
by subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements.54 In practice, 
the principles in the UNFSA have been broadly taken into account by States when establishing new 
subregional or regional fisheries organizations, or in adapting existing organizations which have 
competence to manage straddling fish stocks.55 It should be finally noted that ITLOS emphasized 
the need to seek the cooperation also of States that are not members of a regional organization but 
share the same stocks, directly or through appropriate internationhal organizations, in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of conservation and sustainable management of these stocks in the whole of 
their geographic distribution or migrating area.56 
                                                          
47 Ibid. See Harrison/Morgera on Art. 61 MN 19. 
48 For examples, see discussion in Robin R. Churchillµ0DQDJLQJ6WUDGGOLQJ)LVK6WRFNVLQWKH1RUWK-East Atlantic: A 
Multiplicity of Instruments and Regime Linkages ± EXWKRZHIIHFWLYHDPDQDJHPHQW"¶LQ2ODY6FKUDP6WRNNHHG
Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (2001) 235-272. 
49 Art. 7.1.3 FAO Code of Conduct. 
50 Art. 8 (3) UNFSA (emphasis added). 
51 Art. 8 (5) UNFSA. 
52 Hayashi (note 35), 67. 
53 See Kaare Bangert, Fisheries Agreements, MPEPIL, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. 
54 Arts. 9-10 UNFSA. 
55 See e.g., Secretary-General, The Status and Implementation of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement) and Its Impact on 
Related or Proposed Instruments Throughout the United Nations System, with Special Reference to Implementation of 
Part VII of the Fish Stocks Agreement, Dealing With the Requirements of Developing States, UN Doc. A/58/215 (2003). 
56 SRFC Advisory Opinion (note 4), paras. 215 and 218. 
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Article 64 
Highly migratory species 
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly migratory 
species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive 
economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate international organization exists, the 
coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall cooperate 
to establish such an organization and participate in its work. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply in addition to the other provisions of this Part. 
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highly commercially valuable species such as tuna, swordfish and marlin.2  
2 Compared to Art. 63, Art. 64 creates a notably stronger obligation to cooperate, albeit it does 
not go as far as requiring States to reach agreement.3 It does not just require States to enter into 
negotiations, rather it requires that they engage in the coordinated or joint determination and 
allocation of the total allowable catch for highly migratory species, inclusive of the catch taken within 
the EEZ. As noted by the InternationDO7ULEXQDOIRUWKH/DZRIWKH6HD6WDWHVPXVWµFRQVXOWZLWKRQH
DQRWKHULQJRRGIDLWK¶DQGµWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQVVKRXOGEHPHDQLQJIXOLQWKHVHQVHWKDWVXEVWDQWLDOHIIRUW
should be made by all States concerned, with a view to adopting effective measures necessary to 
FRRUGLQDWHDQGHQVXUHWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIVKDUHGVWRFNV¶4 However, if agreement 
cannot be reached, Art. 64 does not impede coastal States from exercising their sole right to determine 
the conditions under which fishing may take place, enforcement responsibilities and the control over 
research and data collection.5 Without derogating from the rights of the coastal States to regulate and 
manage highly migratory species within its EEZ, Art. 64 nevertheless implies that these unilateral 
decisions cannot be taken only LQ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH FRDVWDO 6WDWH¶V LQWHUHVWV6 In the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Cases, for instance, New Zealand and Australia alleged that Japan had failed to comply 
with its obligation to cooperate in the conservation of the southern bluefin tuna stock by, inter alia, 
failing in good faith to cooperate with New Zealand and Australia with a view to ensuring the 
conservation of the stocks in accordance with Art. 64.7 In prescribing provisional measures in the 
case, the IntHUQDWLRQDO7ULEXQDO IRU WKH/DZRI WKH6HDFRQFOXGHG WKDW µ$XVWUDOLD-DSDQDQG1HZ
Zealand should resume negotiations without delay with a view to reaching agreement on measures 
IRUWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIVRXWKHUQEOXHILQWXQD¶8   
3 The interpretation of this provision needs to take into account several successive 
developments, such as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), the creation of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RFMOs) and the relevance of multilateral environmental agreements. 
II. Historical Background 
4 Given that coastal States only had limited jurisdiction over fishing prior to the development 
of the EEZ, highly migratory species had not arisen in international negotiations as a distinct issue up 
until that time. However, given the economic importance of many highly migratory stocks for distant 
water fishing fleets, controversy surrounded the question as to whether highly migratory species 
should fall under the EEZ regime during discussions at UNCLOS III. At the 1971 session of the Sea-
Bed Committee, the United States proposed empowering international fisheries organizations to 
UHJXODWH OLYLQJ UHVRXUFHV LQFOXGLQJ µKLJKO\ PLJUDWRU\ RFHDQLF VWRFNV¶9 Debates ensued as to the 
degree to which international fisheries organizations would be responsible for managing such species 
or whether States should rather regulate these stocks in agreement or consultation with relevant 
international organizations.10 Eventually, the proposals to require cooperation only through 
international organizations were not accepted and Art. 64 allows both bilateral cooperation and 
                                                          
2 For a comprehensive analysis, see Owen on Annex I. One study valued the tuna industry at US$ 42.21 billion; see Pew 
Charitable Trusts, Netting Billions: A Global Valuation of Tuna (2016). 
3 7KH3HUPDQHQW&RXUWRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XVWLFHVWDWHGWKDWµDQREOLJDWLRQWRQHJRWLDWHGRHVQRWLPSO\DQREOLJDWLRQWRUHDFK
DJUHHPHQW¶3&,-Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, PCIJ Series A/B 
108, 116. 
4 ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory Opinion 
of 2 April 2015, para. 210, available at: https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-21. 
5 Marion Markowski, The International Law of EEZ Fisheries (2010), 51. 
6 Attard (note 1), 186. 
7 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 
August 1999, ITLOS Reports (1999), 280, paras. 28 (i)(d), 29 (1)(d). 
8 Ibid., para. 90 (1)(e) (emphasis added). 
9 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 1), 650. For a detailed analysis of the US proposal, see Owen on Annex I MN 3 et seq. 
10 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 1), 650-656. 
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cooperation through international organizations to be pursued at the same time, as it also allows for 
cooperation through more than one mechanism for the same fishery.11 A proposal to include an 
obligation to adopt conservation measures within the EEZ that are no less effective than international 
standards was unsuccessful.12 
5 In its final form, Art. 64 (2) makes clear that other provisions on EEZ fisheries are applicable 
tRKLJKO\PLJUDWRU\VSHFLHVDQGWKHUHIRUHµFRQILUPVWKHVRYHUHLJQULJKWVRIFRDVWDOVWDWHVWRPDQDJH
KLJKO\PLJUDWRU\VSHFLHVLQWKHLU((=¶13 1RZDGD\VµWKHODUJHPDMRULW\RI6WDWHVFODLPMXULVGLFWLRQ
over all EEZ living resources including highly migratory VSHFLHV¶14 
III. Elements 
µKLJKO\PLJUDWRU\VSHFLHVOLVWHGLQ$QQH[,¶ 
6 Art. 64 applies to those species listed in Annex I of the Convention. The reference to Annex 
,HQWLWOHGµ+LJKO\0LJUDWRU\6SHFLHV¶LVKRZHYHUSUREOHPDWLF)LUVWRIDOOWKHConvention does not 
contain any provision for its adjustment in light of increased knowledge, beyond the normal, 
somewhat cumbersome, amendment procedures.15 Second, some of the species listed in Annex I 
would also fall within the scope of other provisions in Part V. This is particularly problematic for 
FHWDFHDQVDV$QQH[,FRQWDLQVµVRPHEXWQRWDOOFHWDFHDQV¶ZKLFKDUHVSHFLILFDOO\DGGUHVVHGE\$UW
65.16 It has been argued, therefore, that when Art. 64 applies to the cetaceans listed in Annex I in the 
EEZ, it operates as lex generalis, while Art. 65 is a lex specialis which enables coastal States or 
international organizations to prohibit, limit or regulate marine mammals more strictly than Art. 64 
would otherwise allow.17 
µVKDOOFR-RSHUDWH>«@ZLWKDYLew to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of 
RSWLPXPXWLOL]DWLRQ¶ 
7 Art. 64 obliges cooperation towards the conservation and optimum utilization of highly 
migratory species, to the extent possible throughout their range, both within and beyond the EEZ.18 
The reference to the dual goal of ensuring conservation and promoting optimum utilization reflects 
Arts. 61 (2) and 62 (1) in framing the management of highly migratory species as an economic 
resource.19 It has thus been noted that Art. 64 does not override the provisions of Arts. 56, 61-62 of 
the Convention,20 OHDGLQJWRWKHFULWLFLVPWKDWLWµGRHVQRWJRIDUHQRXJKLQSURPRWLQJLWVJRDOV¶DQG
                                                          
11 Ibid., 657. 
12 Second Committee UNCLOS III, United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (1974), OR III, 222, 223-$UWLFOHµ)LVKLQJIRUKLJKO\PLJUDWRU\
species listed in the annex within the economic zone shall be regulated by the coastal States, and beyond the economic zone 
by the State of nationality of the vessel, in accordance with regulations established by appropriate international or regional 
fishing organizations pursuaQWWRWKLVDUWLFOH¶6HHDOVRJohn W. Kindt, The Law of the Sea: Anadromous and Catadromous 
Fish Stocks, Sedentary Species, and the Highly Migratory Species, SJILC 11 (1984), 9, 22-23. 
13 Patricia W. Birnie, Marine Mammals: Exploiting the Ambiguities of Article 65 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and Related Provisions: Practice under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, in: David 
Freestone/Richard Barnes/David M. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (2006), 261, 273. 
14 Attard (note 1), 186. 
15 David H. Anderson, Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, MPEPIL, para. 7, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. 
For further information, cf. Owen on Annex I. 
16 Birnie (note 13), 263. See also Owen on Annex I MN XX.  
17 Birnie (note 13), 274; Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 1), 664. 
18 David Freestone, Implementing Precaution Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Ellen Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (1999), 287, 302; 
Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 1), 657. 
19 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 1), 657. 
20 L. Dolliver M. Nelson, Exclusive Economic Zone, MPEPIL, para. 57, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. For further 
information, cf. Owen on Annex I MN XX.  
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is ultimately seen as treating highly migratory species no differently from others subject to Part V of 
the Convention.21 
8 It has been argued that in light of the widespread acceptance of the obligations contained in 
Art. 64 as reflected in State practice, these obligations are considered a shared responsibility among 
coastal States and States fishing highly PLJUDWRU\VSHFLHVDQGPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGµSDUWDWOHDVWRIWKH
JHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLIQRWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFXVWRP¶22 
9 As has been observed in relation to Art. 63 (2), the international obligation related to highly 
migratory stocks has been elaborated in the UNFSA: for States Parties to UNCLOS that also are 
parties to the UNFSA, the obligation enshrined in Art. 64 is thus complemented by the more specific 
requirements found in the UNFSA that are made specifically applicable to the EEZ, namely its general 
principles (Art. 5 UNFSA), the precautionary approach (Art. 6 UNFSA) and compatibility provisions 
(Art. 7 UNFSA).23 Moreover, the UNFSA provides specific details concerning the issues which 
should be regulated by subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements responsible for highly migratory stocks.24 
µGLUHFWO\RUWKURXJKDSSURSULDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ 
10 Although Art. 64 leaves it open to relevant States whether to cooperate directly or through 
international organizations, it expresses preference for the latter option by encouraging States to 
cooperate to establish such organizations in regions where they do not exist.25 Several RFMOs deal 
with highly migratory species, in particular tuna: Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission, Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organization and the Commission for the Conservation of 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna.26 To provide an example, ICCAT is tasked with carrying out studies of 
the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes and such other species of fishes exploited in tuna fishing 
in the Convention area as are not under investigation by another international fishery organization, 
and making recommendations designed to maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that 
may be taken in the Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch.27 
The most recent Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, which was created in 2004, is 
WDVNHGWRµWRHQVXUHWKURXJKHIIHFWLYHPDQDJHPHQWWKHORQJ-term conservation and sustainable use 
of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 
Convention and thH$JUHHPHQW¶28 According to a Food and Agriculture (FAO) study:  
µ7KHWXQD5)02VXVHVLPLODUSURFHVVHVWRGHYHORSDQGDJUHHRQFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHV7KH\
collect or assemble data about the fisheries, carry out a scientific assessment of the state of the stocks, using 
either dedicated scientific experts or a committee of scientists drawn from members and cooperating 
participants, or some combination of those arrangements. The best scientific advice is presented to their 
governing commission, which then develops any management measures it believes necessary in the light of the 
VFLHQWLILFDGYLFHDQGRWKHU UHOHYDQW IDFWRUV >«@ >7KHLU@ UDWKHUXQZLHOG\GHFLVLRQ-making processes tend to 
result in lowest common denominator decisions rather than producing forward-looking and precautionary 
FRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWPHDVXUHV¶29 
11 Following the adoption and entry into force of the UNFSA, several RFMOs have reviewed 
                                                          
21 Kindt (note 12), 21. 
22 Markowski (note 5), 55. 
23 Art. 3 UNFSA. 
24 Arts. 9-10 UNFSA. See also Harrison/Morgera on Art. 63 and Owen on Annex I. 
25 Markowski (note 5), 52. 
26 Nelson (note 20), para. 56. 
27 Arts. IV, VII International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 14 May 1966, UNTS 673, 63. 
28 Art. II Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean, 5 September 2000, UNTS 2275, 43. 
29 Robin Allen, International Management of Tuna Fisheries: Arrangements, Challenges and Ways Forward, FAO Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Technical Paper 536 (2010), 8. 
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their performance. A recent FAO study, however, concludes that the UNFSA, the precautionary 
DSSURDFKDQGWKHVHWWLQJRIOLPLWSRLQWVµVHHPWRKDYHKDGOLWWOHHIIHFWRQPDQDJHPHQWE\WKHWXQD
5)02V¶30 Accordingly, the General Assembly continues to highlight the persistent need to carry out 
and publish the results of such reviews for all RFMOs, as well as the more general need for RFMOs 
to modernize their mandates to fully incorporate the precautionary and ecosystem approaches to 
fisheries management and biodiversity considerations, including the conservation and management 
of ecologically related and dependent species and protection of their habitat; and improve 
transparency through the development of transparent criteria for the allocation of fishing 
opportunities.31 At the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, governments agreed on 
µWhe need for transparency and accountability in fisheries management by regional fisheries 
PDQDJHPHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ DV ZHOO DV WKH QHHG IRU 5)02V QRW RQO\ WR UHJXODUO\ XQGHUWDNH
independent performance reviews, but also to strengthen the comprehensiveness of those reviews, to 
make their results publicly available, and to implement their recommendations.32 
12 RFMOs have also engaged in wider coordination among themselves: notably, the tuna-related 
organizations have convened joint meetings since 200733 and adopted Course of Actions with a view 
to addressing jointly the excessive global fishing capacity for tunas.34 Nonetheless, the performance 
of RFMOs remains a cause of concern, and has motivated a proposal to list Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
under Appendix I35 of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) which would have had the effect of prohibiting commercial trade in that fish. 
Whilst the proposal was unsuccessful, it brought to the attention of the international community the 
continued inadequacy of the management by the ICCAT and the possibility of resorting to other 
international instruments to address such inadequacy.36 As a follow-up to the failed proposal, the 
Secretariats of CITES and ICCAT are elaborating guidelines for cooperation.37 
4. Sharks as an Example of Highly Migratory Species Listed in Annex I 
13 $QQH[,LQFOXGHVFHUWDLQµRFHDQLFVKDUNV¶DPRQJVWWKHKLJKO\PLJUDWRU\ILVKVWRFNVUHJXODWHG
by Art. 64. Several recent international instruments have focused on sharks, because of their close 
stock-recruitment relationship, long recovery times in response to over-fishing and complex spatial 
structures (size/sex segregation and seasonal migration), providing evidence of State practice 
complying with the obligation enshrined in Art. 64 of cooperating through appropriate international 
organizations. In 1999 the FAO adopted an International Plan of Action (IPOA) for the Conservation 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 30. 
31 GA Res. 65/38 of 7 December 2010, paras. 107-108, 99 and 105. 
32 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want, UN Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1 (2012), 32 (para 172). 
33 First global summit of Tuna RFMOs was held in Kobe, Japan, January 2007. For further information, see http://www.tuna-
org.org/. 
34 The first global summit adopted a Course of Actions with recommendations to standardize the presentation of stock 
assessments and to base management decisions upon the scientific advice, including the application of the precautionary 
and ecosystem-based approach leading to the establishment of measures to minimize the adverse effect of fishing for highly 
migratory fish species on ecologically related species, particularly sea turtles, seabirds and sharks, taking into account the 
characteristics of each ecosystem and technologies used to minimize adverse effect., see Joint Meeting of Tuna Regional 
Fisheries Organizations, Report of the Joint Meeting of Tuna RFMOs (2007), Appendix 14 (TunaRFMOs2007/16).The 
second Joint Tuna RFMOs Meeting, San Sebastian, 2009, adopted a follow-up Course of Actions: Joint Meeting of Tuna 
Regional Fisheries Organizations, Report of the Second Joint Meeting of Tuna Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (RFMOs) (2009). This was acknowledged by the General Assembly, which encouraged continued 
implementation, see GA Res. 65/38 of 7 December 2010, paras. 102-103. See generally, Anderson (note 15), para. 21. 
35 COP CITES, Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties: Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: 
Species Trade and Conservation, COP15 Doc. 52 (Rev. 1) (2010). 
36 Renee Martin-Nagle, Current Legal Developments: Convention on Trade in Endangered Species, IJMCL 25 (2010), 609. 
37 Standing Committee CITES, Sixty-Second Meeting of the Standing Committee: Strategic Matters: Cooperation with 
Other Organization, SC62 Doc. 14.6 (2012), Annex (Guidelines for Cooperation Between The International Commission 
For the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and The Conference of The Parties to the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)). 
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and Management of Sharks, aimed at ensuring their long-term sustainable use.38 The IPOA, which is 
voluntary in nature, applies to States in the waters of which sharks are caught by their own or foreign 
vessels, thereby including the EEZ, and to States the vessels of which catch sharks on the high seas. 
It calls upon States to develop, implement and monitor a national plan of action for conservation and 
management of shark stocks.39 Where transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and high seas 
stocks of sharks are exploited by two or more States, the States concerned should strive to ensure 
effective conservation and management of the stocks, including through the adoption of regional or 
sub-regional plans.40 The General Assembly has called upon States and RFMOs to urgently adopt 
measures to implement the IPOA.41 More recently it has called upon States to take immediate and 
concerted action to improve implementation of and compliance with regional arrangements and 
national measures regulating shark fisheries and incidental catch of sharks, in particular those 
prohibiting fisheries conducted for the sole purpose of harvesting shark fins, as well as upon RFMOs 
to take precautionary conservation and management measures for sharks taken in fisheries.42 Certain 
States have taken legislative action to ban shark-finning.43 
14 Environmental treaties also regulate some species of shark, thus confirming that the relevant 
WUHDW\ERGLHVFDQRSHUDWHDVµDSSURSULDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQV¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI$UW7KH
parties to CITES, which includes Cetorhinus maximus (Basking shark), Rhincodon typus (Whale 
shark) and Carcharodon carcharias (Great white shark) in Appendix II CITES, urged FAO to take 
steps to actively encourage relevant States to develop national plans and encouraged parties to report 
directly to the CITES Secretariat on the implementation of national and regional plans.44 In parallel, 
under the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks was concluded in 
2010,45 covering seven shark species listed on the CMS Appendices: Basking Shark, Great White 
Shark, Whale Shark, Shortfin and Longfin Mako Shark, Porbeagle and Northern hemisphere 
populations of the Spiny Dogfish. The CMS MoU aims to achieve and maintain a favourable 
conservation status for migratory sharks based on the best available scientific information, taking into 
account the socio-economic and other values of these species for the people of the signatories, through 
the application of the precautionary and ecosystem-EDVHG DSSURDFK DQG ZLWK WKH µIXOOHVW SRVVLEOH
FRRSHUDWLRQ¶DPRQJJRYHUQPHQWVLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQVQRQJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
stakeholders of the fishing industry and local communities. 
                                                          
38 FAO, International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, International Plan of Action for 
Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity (1999). For further information, see Erika Techera/Natalie Klein, Fragmented Governance: Reconciling Legal 
Strategies for Shark Conservation and Management, Marine Policy 35 (2011), 73; Holly Edwards, When Predators Become 
Prey: The Need for International Shark Conservation, OCLJ 12 (2007), 305; Margaret Young, Protecting Endangered 
Marine Species: Collaboration between the Food and Agriculture Organization and the CITES Regime, 0HOE-,QW¶O/.11 
(2010), 441. 
39 Allen (note 29), 11, 13-14 (paras. 17-24). 
40 Ibid., 14-15 (paras. 25-26). 
41 GA Res. 61/105 of 8 December 2006, para. 10. 
42 GA Res. 65/38 of 7 December 2010, paras. 13-15. 
43 E.g. Central America Fisheries and Aquaculture Organization, Regulation OSP-05-11 to Ban the Practice of Shark 
Finning in the States Parties of SICA of November 2011, which is legally binding upon domestic and foreign vessels that 
catch and land sharks in areas under the jurisdiction of Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, as well as to vessels fishing in international waters that fly the flag of these countries. 
44 COP CITES, Conservation and Mangement of Sharks (Class Chondrichthyes), Resolution Conf. 12.6 (Rev. CoP15) 
(2010), available at: http://www.cites.org/eng/res/12/12-06R15.php. Sonja Fordham/Coby Dolan, A Case Study in 
International Shark Conservation: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and the Spiny Dogfish, 
Golden Gate University Law Review 34 (2004), 531-571. 
45 UNEP/CMS, Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks, 12 February 2010, available at 
http://www.cms.int/species/sharks/MoU/Migratory_Shark_MoU_Eng.pdf.  
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Article 65 
Marine mammals 
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an international 
organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals 
more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a view to the 
conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through 
the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management and study. 
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I. Purpose and Function 
1 There are around 120 species of marine mammals including cetaceans (whales, dolphins and 
porpoises), pinnipeds (seals and walrus) and sirenians (dugong).1 Art. 65 singles out marine mammals 
for special treatment because of their exceptional vulnerability to capture and adverse effects of other 
human interference, their highly migratory nature2, and their interest both from economic, aboriginal 
use and conservation viewpoints.3 UNCLOS empowers States to give particular consideration to 
marine mammals in the context of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) fisheries and subject them to a 
stricter management regime that is provided by Arts. 61-62.4 ,QDYRLGLQJUHIHUHQFHWRµXWLOL]DWLRQ¶WKH
Convention allows the prohibition or limitation of the exploitation of marine mammals,5 although it 
does not require States to adopt stricter regulation.6  
2 Art. 65 represents an attempt to address the problems that had emerged in the negotiation and 
implementation of previous agreements seeking to prevent the over-exploitation of marine mammals, 
and in particular cetaceans: thus, in allowing coastal States and competent international organizations 
                                                          
1 Donald R. Rothwell/Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2010), 308. 
2 See for information on the relationship between Arts. 64 and 65 also Harrison/Morgera on Art. 64 MN 6. 
3 Patricia W. Birnie, Marine Mammals: Exploiting the Ambiguities of Article 65 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and Related Provisions: Practice under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, in: David 
Freestone/Richard Barnes/David M. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (2006), 261, 264. 
4 Ibid., 274. 
5 David Freestone, Implementing Precaution Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, in: Ellen Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (1999), 287, 302 
(footnote 62); David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (1987), 189. 
6 Alexander Proelss, Marine Mammals, MPEPIL, para.13, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. 
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to develop stricter measures to conserve marine mammals, it preserves the central role played in this 
endeavour by various international bodies.7 
3 Art. 65 includes a competency clause relating to marine mammals within the EEZ, and a 
cooperation clause, which applies to all marine mammals but which specifically mentions cetaceans.8 
The cooperation clause, which is repeated verbatim in Ch. 17 of Agenda 21,9 is considered part of 
customary international law.10 The application of Art. 65 is extended to the high seas by virtue of Art. 
120. 
II. Historical Background 
4 The Bering Fur Seal Arbitration of 189311 LVFRQVLGHUHGWKHµRULJLQVRIWKHOHJDOUXOHVUHOHYDQW
WRWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIPDULQHPDPPDOV¶DVLWFRncerned the legality of pelagic 
sealing beyond the territorial sea.12 The arbitral tribunal recognised the need for the protection of fur 
seals, even if it did not find that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over the fur seals in the 
Bering Sea outside its territorial waters. The tribunal thus adopted a series of regulations aimed at the 
protection of fur seals, including a no-sealing zone, an annual closed season, a licensing system for 
vessels engaged in pelagic sealing, a prohibition on using certain fishing gear and an exception for 
aboriginal sealing.13 Following the decision, a regional convention was concluded for the protection of 
seals. The 1911 Convention between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan for the 
Preservation for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals and Sea Otters in the North Pacific 
Ocean14 was eventually substituted by the 1957 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific 
Fur Seals15 and the Protocol amending and extending the Interim Convention on Conservation of 
North Pacific Fur Seals of 197616. Similar treaties were adopted to address the conservation and 
management of seal populations in other parts of the world, notably the 1972 Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
5 Another category of marine mammals subject to early regulation was cetaceans. Whales have 
been exploited by mankind for many centuries as a source of food and more importantly oil. The first 
industrial whaling is thought to have started in Europe in the eleventh or twelfth centuries but by the 
nineteenth century, the whaling industry had extended its operations around the world.17 The first 
global instrument for the management of cetaceans was the 1931 Convention on the Regulation of 
Whaling,18 which was succeeded by the 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling 
of 193719 and the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). It should be 
further noted that the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas did not deal specifically with marine 
mammals. 
6 Against this background, the special conservation and regulatory needs of marine mammals 
were dLVFXVVHGDW81&/26,,,XQGHUWKHµVWURQJSUHVVXUHDSSOLHGE\HQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVEDFNHGE\
                                                          
7 Birnie (note 3), 262. 
8 Ted McDorman, Canada and Whaling: An Analysis of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention, ODIL 29 29 (1998), 179, 
181-182. 
9 UNCED, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, UN Doc. A.CONF/151/26/REV.1 
(Vol. I) (1992), 9 (Agenda 21). 
10 McDorman (note 8), 187. 
11 Award between the United States and the United Kingdom, Relating to the Rights of Jurisdiction of United States in the 
%HULQJ¶V6HDDQGWKH3UHVHUYDWLRQRI)XU6HDOV (United States v. United Kingdom), Decision of 15 August 1893, RIAA 
XXVIII, 263. 
12 Proelss (note 6), paras. 5-8. 
13 Bering Fur Seal Arbitration (note 11), 263. 
14 Convention between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan for the Preservation for the Preservation and 
Protection of Fur Seals and Sea Otters in the North Pacific Ocean, 7 July 1911, US Treaty Series No. 564. 
15 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 9 February 1957, UNTS 314, 105. 
16 Protocol Amending and Extending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, 7 May 1976, UNTS 
1082, 298. 
17 See Patricia W. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling, vol. 1 (1985), 49-70. 
18 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 24 September 1931, LNTS 155, 349. 
19 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, 8 June 1937, LNTS 190, 79. See discussion in Proelss (note 4), 
paras. 9-11. 
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WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶20 What became Art. 65 originated in a Maltese proposal made in the Sea-Bed 
&RPPLWWHHRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFRQVHUYDWLRQIRUµVHDPDPPDOV¶21 The United States proposed to 
devote a separate provision to marine mammals.22 Successive versions of the relevant draft led to a 
µVHOI-VWDQGLQJSURYLVLRQ¶23 which signalled that Art. 65 was going to be in addition to Art. 64, thus 
µIUHH>LQJ@WKHFRDVWDO>6@WDWHof challenge if it should decide to forbid exploitation of any marine 
PDPPDOZLWKLQLWV((=¶24 Negotiations were nonetheless difficult because of polarized positions on 
ZKDOLQJVRWKHUHVXOWLQJSURYLVLRQHQGHGXSEHLQJµRQHRIWKHPRVWRSDTXHDUWLFOHVLQthe 
>&RQYHQWLRQ@¶25 
III. Elements 
µPDULQHPDPPDOV¶ 
7 $UWLVPDUUHGZLWKDPELJXLWLHVWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWµERWKSURSRQHQWVDQGRSSRQHQWVRI
ZKDOLQJDUJXHWKDWWKH&RQYHQWLRQVXSSRUWVWKHLUSRVLWLRQ¶26 )LUVWRIDOOµPDULQHPDPPDOV¶DUHQRW
defined in the Convention, but the term can be understood as referring to aquatic warm-blooded and 
air-breathing species which are characterized by the production of milk in female mammary glands.27 
Many marine mammals are further characterized by the cyclic nature of their migration between 
breeding and feeding grounds, relatively low reproduction rate and complex social structures.28 The 
WHUPHQFRPSDVVHVFHWDFHDQVSLQQLSHGVVLUHQLDQVVHDRWWHUVDQGSRODUEHDUVZKLFKDUHDOOµWRDJUHDWHU
or lesser degree endangered VSHFLHV¶29, with cetaceans referring to whales, dolphins and porpoises 
more specifically.30  
µ1RWKLQJ>«@UHVWULFWVWKHULJKWRIDFRDVWDO6WDWH>«@WRSURKLELWOLPLWRUUHJXODWHWKH
H[SORLWDWLRQ¶ 
8 As can be deduced from the fact that the text of Art. RPLWVUHIHUHQFHWRWKHWHUPµRSWLPXP
XWLOL]DWLRQ¶ĺ$UW$UWWKLVSURYLVLRQHVWDEOLVKHVDOLPLWHGH[FHSWLRQWRWKHREMHFWLYH
of optimum utilization by permitting coastal States to prohibit or limit the exploitation of marine 
mammals. In other words, coastal States are not obliged to set an allowable catch for marine mammals 
under Art. 61 (1) of the Convention, nor are they obliged to permit access to the allowable catch by 
other States in accordance with Art. 62. BIRNIE also argues that Art. 65 prevails over Art. 61 (4), in 
that the obligation to cooperate for the prohibition, limitation or stricter regulation of marine mammals 
supersedes the consideration of the effects of management measures on stocks of other species 
associated with or dependent upon marine mammals with a view to maintaining or restoring associated 
or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.31 In 
other words, marine mammals cannot be subject to less strict regulation on the grounds that it would 
be necessary to maintain or restore associated or dependent species. 
                                                          
20 Attard (note 5), 189. 
21 Sea-Bed Committee, Malta: Preliminary Draft Articles on the Delimitation of Coastal State Jurisdiction in Ocean Space and 
on the Rights and Obligations of Coastal States in the Areas under Their Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.28 (1973), 
33, cited in: GAOR 28th Sess. Suppl. 21 (A/9021) vol. I, 64. See comments by Patricia W. Birnie, The Conservation and 
Management of Marine Mammals and Anadromous and Catadromous Species, in: Hey (note 5), 357, 370; Myron H. 
Nordquist/Satya N. Nandan/Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 
vol. II (1993), 660. 
22 Second Committee UNCLOS III, United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (1974), 222, 224 (Article 20). 
23 L. Dolliver M. Nelson, Exclusive Economic Zone, MPEPIL, para. 62, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. 
24 Nordquist/Nandan/Rosenne (note 21), 663 (MN 65.11(a)). 
25 Birnie (note 3), 261. 
26 Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International Institutions, Recent Developments and the 
Future of International Whaling Policies, Virginia Environmental Law Journal 24 (2005), 1, 30. 
27 Birnie (note 3), 264. Note that the ICRW does not define whales either, but rather refers to species listed in an Annex; 
Jochen Braig, Whaling, MPEPIL, para. 6, available at: http://www.mpepil.com. 
28 Proelss (note 6), paras. 1-2. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Birnie (note 3), 275. 
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µ6WDWHVVKDOOFR-RSHUDWHZLWKDYLHZWRWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQRIPDULQHPDPPDOV¶ 
9 7KHVHFRQGIXQFWLRQRI$UWLVWRHVWDEOLVKDGXW\IRU6WDWHVWRµFRRSHUDWH with a view to the 
FRQVHUYDWLRQRIPDULQHPDPPDOV¶$VSHFLDOUHIHUHQFHLVPDGHWRFHWDFHDQVLQUHODWLRQWRZKLFK
6WDWHVDUHXQGHUDQREOLJDWLRQWRµZRUNWKURXJKWKHDSSURSULDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQVIRUWKHLU
FRQVHUYDWLRQPDQDJHPHQWDQGVWXG\¶This description suggests that such organizations play a 
different role than other regional fisheries management organizations set up to regulate fishing. Art. 65 
GRHVQRWKRZHYHUFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKZKHQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQZRXOGEHµDSSURSULDWH¶IRUWKH
SXUSRVHVRIWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDGLVWLQFWUHJLPHIRUPDULQHPDPPDOV,WKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWµLWLV
only where the coastal [S]tate opts to delegate such jurisdiction to an international organization, that 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQEHFRPHV³DSSURSULDWH´LQWKHVHQVHRIWKHILUVWVHQWHQFHRIDUWLFOH¶32 
10 With specific regard to the cooperation clause in the second sentence of Art. 65, the expression 
µZRUNWKURXJK¶LVFRQVLGHUHGLQVXIILFLHQWWRGHWHUPLQHWKHµGHJUHHRUPHDQVRIFROODERUDWLRQ
UHTXLUHG¶33 It would seem that Art. 65 does not require States to become members of relevant 
international organizations or even to adhere to the regulations adopted by these organizations.34 It has 
WKXVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWWKHREOLJDWLRQWRµZRUNWKURXJK¶FRXOGEHVDWLVfied by mere cooperation with 
scientific bodies of relevant international organizations or active engagement in the organization as 
observers.35 Canada in particular had made a declaration noting that Art. 65 does not entail an 
obligation to work through more than one appropriate international organization and in all events such 
obligation is triggered only when the status of the stock is such that the attention of the appropriate 
international organization is necessary to assist in the conservation, management and study of the 
stock.36 
11 Notwithstanding its limitations, this provision has been considered particularly significant for 
its inclusion LQDFRPSUHKHQVLYHWUHDW\WKHSUHDPEOHRIZKLFKUHIOHFWVWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶V
awareness of the complex management problems concerning marine living resources and the 
relevance of legal developments before and after the Convention.37 In addition, the lack of reference to 
exploitation and the emphasis on conservation could be considered apt to support the adoption of 
moratoria, although the specific choice of means of enforcement is left to relevant coastal States on the 
basis of Art. 62, and international organizations.38 Several States have indeed established through 
national legislation sanctuaries for marine mammals in their EEZ.39 
µLQWKHFDVHRIFHWDFHDQV>6WDWHV@VKDOOLQSDUWLFXODUZRUNWKURXJKWKHDSSURSULDWH
international organziations for WKHLUFRQVHUYDWLRQPDQDJHPHQWDQGVWXG\¶ 
12 As BIRNIE emphasizes, Art. 65 cannot be understood by reference only to the drafting history 
RIWKH&RQYHQWLRQEXWDOVRRIWKHµPRUHWKDQDKXQGUHG\HDUV¶RILQWHUQDWLRQDODWWHPSWVWRLQWURGXFH
protective measures for marine mammals.40 Successive international developments in relation to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine mammals are equally relevant to interpret Art. 65. 
13 One such global agreement is certainly the ICRW which applies to all waters in which whaling 
is undertaken,41 thus also to the EEZ.42 While the ICRW was conceived as a treaty for the preservation 
of whale stocks to ensure the continuation of the whaling industry,43 it led to the adoption of the so-
                                                          
32 McDorman (note 8), 182. 
33 Birnie (note 21), 370. 
34 Proelss (note 6), para. 14. 
35 Braig (note 27), para. 41; McDorman (note 8), 182-187. 
36 McDorman (note 8), 183. 
37 Birnie (note 3), 262. 
38 Id. (note 21), 370-371. 
39 See examples discussed in Robin R. Churchill/Alan V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn. 1999), 318-319. 
40 Birnie (note 3), 261. 
41 Art. I ICRW. 
42 The ICRW itself is conceived as setting minimum standards and therefore States may adopt and enforce laws or 
regulations within their jurisdiction which give additional protection to whales provided they are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the ICRW; see International Whaling Conference, Report of the Drafting Committee at the International 
Whaling Conference, Doc. IWC/49 (1946). 
43 Braig (note 27). 
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called moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982,44 following a recommendation adopted at the 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.45 The moratorium is still in place, although parties 
to the ICRW continue to debate whether the Convention has become a conservation rather than a 
sustainable use instrument: parties have established whale sanctuaries46 and adopted non-binding 
recommendations on conservation issues such as the impacts of climate change on whales and trade in 
whale products, but also adopted a Revised Management Procedure in 1994 with a view to resuming 
commercial whaling in the future once the accompanying revised management scheme on 
enforcement is completed.47 As a result of polarized views on the ultimate aim of this convention48, the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO:KDOLQJ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDFWLYLW\KDVUHVXOWHGLQSHULRGLFPHHWLQJVLQZKLFKµULYDOJURXSV
>RI6WDWHV@DJUHHWRGLVDJUHHRQFUXFLDOLVVXHV¶49 
14 Notably, UNCLOS does not refer explicitly to the International Whaling Commission (IWC), 
the only international organization related to marine mammals that was in existence at the time of its 
negotiation. This omission, and the reference to international organizations in plural, implicitly 
UHFRJQL]HVWKHGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKH,:&¶VDFWLYLWLHVWRFRQVHUYHPDULQHPDPPDOVDQGOHDYHVWKH
door open for the application of other international instruments.50 Other relevant institutions in fact 
include the UN Environment Programme, with its regional seas conventions, and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as well as other international organizations that 
address activities that negatively impact on marine mammals, such as land-based sources of marine 
pollution.51  
15 One global international regulatory instrument is the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 52 which currently lists all whale species in its 
Appendix I, reflecting the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling53 as well as in recognition of the 
IDFWWKDWµLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHLQZKDOHPHDWDQGRWKHUSURGXFWV>RWKHUZLVHODFNV] adequate international 
PRQLWRULQJRUFRQWURO¶54 In further acknowledgement that any illegal trade in whale products 
undermines the effectiveness of both CITES and the IWC, CITES parties also authorized the 
Secretariat to exchange information and consult with the IWC on all proposals to list or delist 
cetaceans from its Appendices.55  
                                                          
44 3DUDJUDSKHRIWKH6FKHGXOHWRWKH,&5:SURYLGHVWKDWµFDWFKOLPLWVIRUWKHNLOOLQJIRUFRPPHUFLDOSXUSRVHVRIZKDOHV
from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept 
under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive 
assessment of the effects of this decision on whales stocks and consider the modification of this provision and the establishment 
of othHUFDWFKOLPLWV¶ 
45 UNCHE, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/REV. 1 (1973), 
6 (Action Plan for the Human Environment). 
46 Sanctuaries have been adopted in the Indian Ocean and the Southern Ocean; see ICRW, Schedule, para. 7. Several IWC 
members are also proposing the establishment of a third sanctuary in the South Atlantic Ocean and the proposal will be 
discussed at the 2016 meeting of the IWC.  Note that the legality of the establishment of sanctuaries under the ICRW is 
contested: Elisa Morgera, Whale Sanctuaries: An Evolving Concept within the International Whaling Commission, ODIL 35 
(2004), 319.  
47 Proelss (note 6), paras. 15-UHIHUVWRWKHUHYLVHGPDQDJHPHQWVFKHPHDVµZLGHO\FRQVLGHUHGDVRQHRIWKHPRVWULJRURXV
DQGFRQVHUYDWLYHPDQDJHPHQWVFKHPHVIRUOLYLQJPDULQHUHVRXUFHVHYHUGHYHORSHG¶ZKLOHCarlarne (note 26), 14-21 notes 
criticism for its inadequate ecosystem approach. 
48 See ICJ, Case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan; New Zealand Intervening), Merits, Judgment of 31 
0DUFK,&-5HSRUWVSDUDZKHUHWKH&RXUWKLJKOLJKWHGWKDWµDPHQGPHQWVWRWKH6FKHGXOHDQG
recommendations by the IWC may put an emphasis on one or other objective pursued by the Convention, but cannot alter its 
REMHFWDQGSXUSRVH¶ 
49 Birnie (note 3), 275. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 265, 272.  
52 Erik Franckx, The Protection of Biodiversity and Fisheries Management: Issues Raised by the Relationship between 
CITES and LOSC, in: David Freestone et al. (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (2006), 210. 
53 Birnie (note 3), 276; Proelss (note 6), para. 18; Alexander Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy (2005), 337-338. Although attempts 
have been made to down-list certain whale species, these have been so far unsuccessful, ibid., 338-345. 
54 COP CITES, Illegal Trade in Whale Meat, Resolution Conf. 9.12 (CoP9) (1994); see comments by Gillespie (note 53), 
328. 
55 COP CITES, Conservation of Cetaceans, Trade in Cetacean Specimens and the Relationship with the International Whaling 
Commission, Resolution Conf. 11.4 (Rev. CoP 12) (2000); see also Gillespie (note 53), 328, who also reports on IWC 
resolutions on trade in whale products before and after the adoption of CITES; Carlarne (note 26), 22-28. 
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16 Several regional arrangements should also be regarded as relevant for the purposes of Art. 65. 
First of all, certain whaling countries (Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands) established 
the Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in 
the North Atlantic, which established the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission with the 
objective to contribute through regional consultation and cooperation to the conservation, rational 
management and study of marine mammals in the North Atlantic.56 While this organization is largely 
seen as an alternative forum to the IWC, it has so far not functioned as a regulatory body but only as a 
forum for data collection.57 
17 The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) is also a 
salient international framework that has focused on marine mammals, listing several cetaceans in its 
DSSHQGLFHVDQGKDYLQJEHFRPHµWKHIRUHPRVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOERG\¶IRUWKHFRQVHUYDWLRQRIVPDOO
cetaceans in particular.58 In addition, a series of regional conservation agreements have been 
developed in the framework of CMS, such as the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the 
Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS), the Agreement on the 
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas, the Agreement on the Conservation of 
Seals in the Wadden Sea, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management 
of Dugongs and their Habitats throughout their Range59, the Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning Conservation Measures for the Eastern Atlantic Populations of the Mediterranean Monk 
Seal,60 and the Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans and Their Habitats 
in the Pacific Islands Region61. These agreements have been considered pure conservation treaties, 
being based on the precautionary approach and having led to the adoption of comprehensive 
conservation and management plans.62 1RWDEO\WKHVHDJUHHPHQWVUHFRJQL]HLQWKHLUSUHDPEOHVµWKH
LPSRUWDQFHRIRWKHUJOREDODQGUHJLRQDOLQVWUXPHQWV>«@VXFKDVWKH>,&5:@¶63 In 2011 CMS parties 
adopted a Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans,64 including global collaborative action to address 
entanglement and by-catch and climate change as a high priority; ship strikes, pollution, marine noise 
and habitat and feeding ground degradation as a lower priority; as well as the development of a formal 
process within CMS for providing comPHQWVWR&,7(6RQSURSRVDOVWRDPHQGWKHODWWHU¶V$SSHQGLFHV
and to seek comments from CITES on proposals to amend the CMS Appendices.65 
18 Other relevant agreements include the 1998 Agreement on the International Dolphin 
Conservation Programme,66 which aims to progressively reduce the incidental dolphin mortalities in 
tuna purse-seine fishery to levels approaching zero through the setting of annual limits and the long-
term sustainability of the tuna stocks in the Agreement area. Its implementation is being coordinated 
by the ICCAT. Another prominent instrument is the 1999 Agreement between France, Italy and 
Monaco establishing the Ligurian Sea Sanctuary in the Mediterranean Sea establishing an area within 
which killing, attempt to taking and harassment of cetaceans (including small cetaceans) is prohibited, 
as well as providing an innovative framework to regulate habitat preservation (in terms of prevention 
                                                          
56 Art. 2 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic. 
57 Proelss (note 6), paras. 19-20; Carlarne (note 26), 29. 
58 Gillespie (note 53), 333. 
59 UNEP/CMS, Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Dugongs and their Habitats 
throughout Their Range, 31 October 2007, available at: 
http://www.cms.int/species/dugong/pdf/Annex_08_Dugong_MoU.pdf. 
60 UNEP/CMS, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Eastern Atlantic Populations of 
the Mediterranean Monk Seal (Monachus Monachus), 18 October 2007, available at: 
http://www.cms.int/species/monk_seal/Monk_Seal_MoU_with_signatures_En.pdf. 
61 UNEP/CMS, Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans and Their Habitats in the Pacific Islands 
Region, 9 September 2006, available at: 
http://www.cms.int/species/pacific_cet/_CMS_Pacific_Cetaceans_MoU_E_amended.pdf. 
62 Proelss (note 6), para. 23. For other relevant agreements, see ibid., paras. 25-26. 
63 E.g., Recital 11 Preamble ACCOBAMS. This reflects the conflict clause in Art. XII (2) CMS, Gillespie (note 53), 332. 
64 COP CMS, Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 1.15 (2011). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, 15 May 1998, available at: 
http://iattc.org/PDFFiles2/AIDCP-amended-Oct-2009.pdf. It was adopted by the 35th Intergovernmental Meeting on the 
Conservation of Tunas and Dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Ocean; the Secretariat is hosted in Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission (ICCAT). 
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of pollution and restriction to navigation), fishing techniques, scientific research, whale-watching, and 
education activities.67 
19 Some States have also unilaterally addressed this issue by banning imports of fish caught 
using techniques which may be harmful to marine mammals. However, such action has sometimes 
been challenged as a violation of international trade rules.68 The most recent of these cases concerned 
a United States measure designed to promote the conservation of dolphins by imposing strict 
FRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHXVHRIDµGROSKLQ-VDIH¶ODEHORQWXQDSURGXFWVLPSRUWHGLQWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,Q
response to a challenge by Mexico, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization found there 
was a violation of the non-discrimination provision in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
because tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific had to meet more stringent conditions in order to 
EHODEHOHGµGROSKLQ-IULHQGO\¶FRPSDUHGZLWKWXQDFDXJKWLQRWKHUSDUWVRIWKHZRUOG69 At the same 
time, the Appellate Body confirmed that the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade allowed the 
United States to adopt a unilateral standard which was stricter than the standards contained in the 1998 
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme to which it was a party.70 
20 ,WFDQEHFRQFOXGHGWKDW$UWLVµDIUDPHZRUN¶SURYLVLRQ the implementation of which is 
dependent on more specific regional and global agreements.71 Its merit has been allowing, if not 
encouraging, continued debate on marine mammals regulation in a variety of international fora72 and 
to some extent also their cooperation.73
                                                          
67 /¶$FFRUGUHODWLIjODFUpDWLRQHQ0pGLWHUUDQpHG
XQ6DQFWXDLUHpour le Mammifères Marins, 25 November 1999 (original 
languages are French and Italian), available at: http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/sanctuary_fr.htm For a legal analysis of the 
treaty, see Tullio Scovazzi, The Mediterranean Marine Mammals Sanctuary, IJMCL 16 (2001), 132. 
68 See e.g. GATT Panel Report, US ± Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, 3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD 
39S/155. 
69 Report of the WTO Appellate Body, US ± Measures concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products:7'6$%50D\SDUDµWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDVQRWGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQODEHOLQJ
conditions for tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna products 
FRQWDLQLQJWXQDFDXJKWE\RWKHUILVKLQJPHWKRGVRXWVLGHWKH(73RQWKHRWKHUKDQGLVµFDOLEUDWHG¶WRWKHULVNVWRGROSKLQV
DULVLQJIURPGLIIHUHQFHILVKLQJPHWKRGVLQGLIIHUHQWDUHDVRIWKHRFHDQ¶ 
70 Ibid., para. 401. 
71 Proelss (note 6), para. 14. 
72 Birnie (note 3), 266. 
73 E.g., the above-mentioned cooperation between CITES and the IWC and also the, IWC, Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Secretariat of the IWC and the Secretariat of the CMS, Appendix 2, IWC 52nd Meeting Report (2001), where 
WKHWZRERGLHVµWRWKHH[WHnt possible, coordinate their programme of activities to ensure that their implementation is 
FRPSOHPHQWDU\DQGPXWXDOO\VXSSRUWLYH¶Gillespie (note 53), 332-337. 
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